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News Updates: Irish Parliament Abdicates Legislation, Who are the Bond-Holders? EU Propaganda Junkets

Open Europe
Press Summary Archive
11 October 2010
http://www.openeurope.org.uk/media-centre/summary.aspx?id=1204

The Irish edition of the Sunday Times reported that Edmund Honohan, Master of the Irish High Court, has accused the Irish Parliament of failing to assert Irish legislation over new laws from Brussels and delegating much of the workload involved in scrutinising EU law to civil servants.


http://www.swp.ie/editorial/who-are-bond-holders/3669
Who are the Bond-holders?
SWP / Kieran Allen, 08/10/2010

‘We must re-assure the bondholders about the economy’. This line is trotted out daily in the Irish media. But who are these bondholders? The strange feature of current debates is that the Irish people never get told to whom we are supposed to pay all these debts […]

Last Saturday the Financial Times published data on bondholders for Irish government debt. The figures relate to July 2010 when European banks were asked to provide information to the Committee of European Banking Supervisors as part of a stress test. Although the data is a few months old, we may reasonably assume that the pattern has not changed when interest rates shot up to 6.5%. It should be noted that the figures below pertain only to Irish state debt. We still do not know who the bondholders of Anglo-Irish or the wider banking system because this is supposed to be ‘commercially secret’ information. Read it carefully and you will get an insight into the shocking skulduggery that is going on here.

TOP 10 BANKS WHO HOLD IRISH GOVERNMENT BONDS

    1. Royal bank of Scotland £4.3 billion
    2. Allied Irish banks €4.1 billion
    3. Bank of Ireland €1.2 billion
    4. Credit Agricole €929 million
    5. HSBC $816 million
    6. Danske Bank €655 million
    7. BNP Paribas €571 million
    8. Groupe BPCE €491 million
    9. Societe Generale €453 million
    10. Banco BP1 €408 million

The Royal Bank of Scotland is owned by the British government and Peter Sutherland was one of its directors until 2009. Sutherland often lectures the Irish population on the need for cutbacks – but he never reveals this link. The big surprise, however, is that the two biggest bondholders are Irish Banks. The people of Ireland have already put €7 billion in these two banks – but they then screw us twice by lending back our own money at higher interest rates. Imagine working class taxpayers delivering billions at the front door of the bank and then the directors scurrying around the back door to lend us back our own money and to call for more sacrifices. It is time to end this madness now.


http://synonblog.dailymail.co.uk/2010/10/is-this-how-the-eu-got-a-yes-to-lisbon-from-the-irish.html
Is this how the EU got a Yes to Lisbon from the Irish?
Daily Mail Ireland Online / Mary Ellen Synon, 7 October 2010

The European Commission has just flown 15 Irish journalists to Brussels for a two-day ‘information visit’. Or as those of us who know Brussels and talk straight would put it, for a two-day, two-night taxpayer-funded propaganda junket at a four-star hotel.

Ireland and the other eurozone countries might be suffering savage spending cuts, but the EU self-publicity budget thrives: in 2008 the Open Europe think-tank calculated that the EU was spending at least €2 billion a year on ‘information’.

Much of it bent, which is to say, propaganda. The commission actually admits that its information is bent. One of its publications declares: ‘Genuine communication by the European Union cannot be reduced to the mere provision of information.’

The EU propaganda machine pumps money into lobby groups that support ‘ever closer union’. They push propaganda into schools. And almost more than anything else, they target the Press. Journalists are offered ‘free’ trips and training (yes, just like Scientology offers training). The EU gives out cash prizes to on-message journalists.

A parliamentary Press official told me this week that a large number of Irish news organisations are given free flights to Strasbourg to cover the parliament, plus €360 in cash for expenses. (The Irish Daily Mail takes none of these taxpayer-funded handouts.)

 

[…]I got myself into the middle of it to hear what it was the commission and parliament propaganda machine would say to these 15 EU-innocents coming from Dublin. I cut the hotel and the other freebies – I live in Brussels – and stuck to the meetings. Meanwhile the journalists piled off their EU taxpayer-funded €377-a-head flight and into their EU taxpayer-funded rooms at the Hotel Manos Stephanie (’the Louis XV furniture, marble lobby and plentiful antiques set a standard of elegance rarely encountered,’ the hotel brags, and so it should since the rate is listed at €295 a night for a single room).

I said ‘No, thanks’ to the swish free lunch (well, not free to the taxpayers: it cost taxpayers €30 for each journo) in the private dining room at the European Parliament on Tuesday. It wasn’t hard to say No. The truth is I get gag-reflex when someone offers me taxpayer-funded food. I can never get that line from Abraham Lincoln out of my head, about the lure of ‘the same old serpent that says you work and I eat’.

I only wanted to be there to see how the propaganda machine would seek to mislead. For example: one theme that turned up in briefings on the economy was that the euro had nothing to do with Ireland’s economic disaster, nor indeed with any economic disaster anywhere in Europe.

Yet it was the low interest rates of the early years of the euro that set fire to our property bubble. It was the illusion of eurozone convergence that allowed our banks to suck in billions from saver-countries such as Germany.

The propaganda orthodoxy in the EU will admit no such damage. What the Irish journalists were given this week was the Bart Simpson excuse for the damage done by the euro: ‘I didn’t do it. Nobody saw me.’ This wasn’t information, it was a propaganda pitch.

[…] One of the meetings the Press officers had arranged was a session with five Irish members of the European Parliament.
[…] I thought I’d try to put the concerns of these politicians about the economy into Brussels-perspective. Remember, we were talking to politicians who will bank a half-million euros just from their salaries over the course of this parliament. Last year I added up some of the perks they get on top, everything from daily allowances to business-class air travel to medical allowances to free disposable contact lenses to reimbursement for 60 sessions a year of mud baths. Being an MEP is a lotto win. How do you stay in sympathy with the unemployed in West Dublin with a life like that?

So I asked the five MEPs to justify the decision last week by the parliament’s budget committee to increase the MEPs’ entertainment budget for 2011 by 85 per cent. How could they justify that, given the suffering of people across Europe?

The five said they’d heard about no such thing. Mr de Rossa even denied there was an entertainment budget for MEPs. He suggested that newspapers had made up the story.

Since I was one of the journalists who had reported the story, I knew it had not been made up. I’d had my information from Marta Andreasen, an MEP who is a professional accountant. More to the point, she is a member of the parliament’s Budget Committee.

Here are the figures, as from this professional accountant: the MEPs’ entertainment budget for next year has jumped from €1,105,200 to €

2,047,450. Yet the five Irish MEPs at this propaganda-fest denied it in front of 15 Dublin journalists plus me. Unless I could identify the exact budget line for them right then, the MEPs said they wouldn’t admit such a thing could have happened.

The other journalists, unused to the ways of the parliament, couldn’t make anything of it. But I will give credit to Mairéad McGuinness, who, despite being indignant about my suggestion, had her staff check it. She came back to me a couple of hours later with a piece of paper showing the figures for a budget line labelled ‘Entertainment and representation expenses’. There it was: the huge jump in the entertainment budget that the Irish MEPs had all earlier denied could exist.

Half the eurozone is bleeding to death, but the MEPs will take a jump next year of 85 per cent for their ‘entertainment’.

[…]When Miss Day brought her comments around to the new so-called European External Action Service (the euphemism for the new EU diplomatic corps which is going to lead to the closing of many Irish embassies around the world), she assured the Dublin journalists that this vast army of diplomats and embassies would in fact be ‘revenue neutral, except for the first year.’

I waited for someone to ask, ‘But what about the first year, then?’ None of them did. I realised that even the sharp ones weren’t used to listening to eurocrats’ slimy-speak. If they’d asked (I didn’t, it was 6 pm and I was losing the will to go on), and if she’d given a straight answer, the Irish journalists would have learned the shocking truth.

What her propaganda pitch didn’t mention about Catherine Ashton’s new empire was that the new service is in raging cost-overrun. It is going to head for at least ¤33 million over its ¤455 million budget this year already – and it hasn’t even been launched yet.

Thirty-three million over budget in one year, and that is just called a failure to be ‘revenue neutral’. As I said, eurocrats’ slimy-speak. It’s the painful torture of a life in Brussels.

The EU-innocents last night boarded their flight back to Dublin. Before they left, I asked three of them if they’d felt their trip was a good use of taxpayers’ money. All three agreed it was.

I may ask them again after they see the tax increases that Finance Minister Brian Lenihan has planned for them in the next Budget. How strange that some journalists haven’t figured it out yet: there really is no such thing as a free lunch. Just like there’s no such thing as EU ‘information’.

Anthony Coughlan on the Eamon Dunphy Show

Audio file:

  • 100521_NewsTalk_Dunphy_Coughlan: Eamon Dunphy (”The Eamon Dunphy Show”: NewsTalk106fm) has Anthony Coughlan on with his panel of guests, to discuss the Irish and European economies, and the trials and tribulations of the Euro☚ (time -19:20; format – M4a/Quicktime/iTunes; date – May 16, 2010);

To access via iTunes, either:

Rescuing Banks and rich Greeks … The slow demise of the euro

www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,695245,00.html
05/18/2010 03:54 PM
Former Central Bank Head Karl Otto Pöhl
Bailout Plan Is All About ‘Rescuing Banks and Rich Greeks’

The 750 billion euro package the European Union passed last week to prop up the common currency has been heavily criticized in Germany. Former Bundesbank head Karl Otto Pöhl told SPIEGEL that Greece may ultimately have to opt out, and that the foundation of the euro has been fundamentally weakened.


www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=109323
The slow demise of Europe’s single currency looks certain
MATTHEW LYNN
Business Day / Bloomberg
2010/05/19

THE time for tough decisions is here. In the next few months, the members of the euro area will have to make a choice: form a genuine fiscal and political union or let the euro die a slow death.

The European Union (EU) realises the Greek crisis has revealed great flaws in the common currency. There is no point trying to fudge it. The euro can be rescued only by a sweeping centralisation of control over tax and spending.

There’s just one snag: a single economic government for the euro area is not going to work. The surrender of national sovereignty is too great. The timing is all wrong. And there is still no realistic mechanism for enforcing whatever new rules are made in Frankfurt or Brussels.

Two top economists in New York Times highlight folly of Ireland’s economic policy

economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/20/irish-miracle-or-mirage/
Irish Miracle – Or mirage?
Peter Boone and Simon Johnson
Economix
New York Times
Friday 21 May 2010

(Peter Boone is chairman of the charity Effective Intervention and a research associate at the Center for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics. He is also a principal in Salute Capital Management Ltd. Simon Johnson, the former chief economist at the International Monetary Fund, is the co-author of “13 Bankers.”)

With the European Central Bank announcing that it has bought more than $20 billion of mostly high-risk euro-zone government debt in one week, its new strategy is crystal clear: We will take the risk from bank balance sheets and give it to the central bank, and we expect Portugal-Ireland-Italy-Greece-Spain to cut fiscal spending sharply and pull themselves out of this mess through austerity.

But the bank’s head, Jean-Claude Trichet, faces a potential major issue: the task assigned to the profligate nations could be impossible. Some of these nations may be stuck in a downward debt spiral that makes greater economic decline ever more likely…

… reland’s politicians, rather than facing up to their problems, are making things ever worse. Simply put, the Irish miracle was a mirage driven by clever use of tax-haven rules and a huge credit boom that permitted real estate prices and construction to grow quickly before declining ever more rapidly. The biggest banks grew to have assets twice the size of official G.D.P. when they essentially failed in 2008. The government has now made a fateful choice: rather than make creditors pay some part of the losses, it is taking the bank debt onto the national balance sheet, effectively ballooning its already large sovereign debt. Irish taxpayers are set to be left with the risk of very large payments to make on someone else’s real estate deals gone bad.

There is no simple escape, but if the government hopes to avoid a sovereign default, the one overriding priority should be to stop bailing out the banks. Instead, the government should wind down existing banks in a “bad bank,” while moving their deposit base and profitable businesses into new, well-capitalized banks that can function without a taxpayer burden. This will be messy, but it is far better than a sovereign default.

Second, the Irish must take the tough fiscal steps that will be required under any circumstances. The International Monetary Fund and the European Union have made clear that funding is available to Ireland – so the government should use this to bridge the tough journey of fiscal cuts ahead.

Finally, the Irish need to consider seriously whether being in the euro zone is worth the cost. The adjustment to this awful situation would be far easier outside the euro zone – even though leaving the zone might have adverse repercussions for other nations. Once again, a comprehensive program with European Union and I.M.F. support might make this the least worse option.
Given the depths of Ireland’s problems, it is no wonder the markets are looking with skepticism at the announced bailout package for the entire euro zone provided by the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. Policy makers are still not dealing with the core problems of each nation in the euro zone. With the debt hangovers remaining, who will want to invest in Europe’s periphery, and so how can Greece, let alone Ireland, grow? One thing we can be sure of: Europe’s political leaders are doomed to be spending much more time at emergency meetings in Brussels over the coming months and years.

Thinking the Unthinkable on the euro crisis

From www.german-foreign-policy.com Newsletter, 12 May 2010 .

BERLIN: Following the passage of the 750 billion Euro bailout package, the debate on Germany’s leaving the EU monetary union has become more intense. Business representatives confirm that German industry, which exports heavily to other countries within the Euro zone, has up to now greatly benefited from the common currency. If an austerity program can be successfully imposed on Southern Europe, establishing a pan-European economic “model” patterned on Germany, the Euro will remain advantageous for Germany. But strong resistance is expected from Greece and other countries. If expensive transfer payments cannot be avoided, it may become necessary “to think the unthinkable” of Germany “leaving the monetary union” writes the business press.

In the long run, Germany’s withdrawal from the Euro zone is, in fact, highly probable, Swedish economics scholar Stefan de Vylder tells german-foreign-policy.com. The first insinuations about the probable consequences indicate that serious tensions can be expected in Europe.

Dr De Vylder is former professor at the Stockholm School of Economics, former chief economist at the Swedish International Development Authority and currently runs his own economic consultancy in Stockholm.

Dr Stefan de Vylder: Greece has until now been the ideal scapegoat. […]
There are a large number of culprits which either have contributed directly to the crisis or failed to warn against it, let alone do something about it […]

But from a macroeconomic perspective, the biggest single problem is Germany… the country’s huge current account surplus makes it virtually impossible for the majority of EMU countries whose international competitiveness has become eroded to solve their problems […]

If Greece were to be thrown out of the euro zone – which in the long run would be good for the country – no structural problem for the entire currency union would be solved…

[…] Although it is perfectly true that a currency union such as EMU, which by definition has a single rate of interest and a single rate of exchange, would need a far-reaching coordination of economic policies to function even moderately well… attempts to create an “economic government” within the EU would probably accelerate the road to disaster.

[…] I would be extremely surprised if today’s euro zone members are still members ten years from now. Extremely surprised… The European peoples’ sense of solidarity is at stake.

If one or several of the weaker countries were to leave the euro zone, the price they would have to pay is likely to be very high (in the short run)…

Germany does not need the euro to maintain its international competitiveness and excellent access to international credit markets. So my forecast is that Germany one day will decide that it is in the best interest of the country – and in the interest of the weaker euro zone countries as well! – to leave the currency union.

… Another scenario would be the creation of a smaller currency union between a few member states… and let the others go back to their own currencies.

… compared to defending an extremely poorly designed monetary union, I think the price would be worth paying…

For further information see: www.german-foreign-policy.com Newsletter, 12 May 2010 .

To save the eurozone, reform its governance: FT.com

Wolfgang Münchau
Financial Times
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7e114d26-6115-11df-9bf0-00144feab49a.html
Monday 16 May 2010

The eurozone was never under speculative attack at any time. What happened was that investors, European pension funds among them, lost confidence in the system. And while fiscal profligacy was the root cause of the problems in Greece, it is not the root cause of the problems in Portugal and Spain. That would be a combination of a defunct labour market and massive indebtedness of the private sector.

But instead of solving those structural problems, the two countries last week responded with a fiscal tightening. What makes the economic problem in the Iberian peninsula so difficult is the simultaneous need to reduce debt and improve competitiveness. A reader wrote from Madrid last week that, in his estimation, the price level in his city was about 30 to 40 per cent higher than in Germany – as a result of which he orders all his durable goods from abroad. It is not surprising therefore that we are starting to see core price deflation as Spain cannot maintain a large price differential with Germany forever. If you add fiscal retrenchment into this toxic debt-deflation mix, the result is bound to be a self-sustaining depression, especially in the absence of structural reforms.

So when the European Union’s programme of credit guarantees ends in three years, the same combination of factors that led to the most recent crisis will still be present. The economic situation in Spain and Portugal will have deteriorated. And even if the Greek austerity programme works like clockwork, the country will still probably have to restructure its debt eventually.

What is completely missing in Brussels – and even more so in Berlin – is an understanding of the urgency of the situation. None of the governance reform proposals that are currently discussed even attempt to answer the questions of how Spain is going to get out of this hole, and how the competitiveness gap between the north and the south of the eurozone is going to be closed…

When I read the details of the rescue package, I thought it was ironic that a special purpose vehicle had been chosen to save the eurozone, given our most recent experience with those toxic structures. Come to think of it, perhaps not. They are the perfect instruments if a lack of clarity and transparency is the ultimate purpose. As the fog lifts we will notice that, despite the shiny new umbrella, not much will have changed.

The Consequences of Monetary Union (1972)

The financier and businessman Emmett O’Connell, formerly of Aminex and Eglinton Oil and still successfully engaged in the international mining business, has long held the view that abolishing the Irish pound and joining the eurozone was the biggest policy error ever made by the Irish State. The Greek crisis and its drastic implications for the euro-currency, interwoven as it is with the crisis of the Irish public deficit and banks, seems to be confirming this daily before our eyes.

Linked below for your information is a facsimile of a pamphlet☚ which Emmett O’Connell wrote in 1972. It sets out why joining a European currency union would not be in Ireland’s best interests.

[Also linked below: a Podcast audio extract☚ of an interview with Mr. O’Connell by George Hook on this subject, on NewsTalk106fm, Monday 10th of May]

This was one of a number of pamphlets published at the time by the Common Market Study Group, of which the undersigned, the late Raymond Crotty and Mr Micheal O Loingsigh of Tralee were key members. The Common Market Study Group was the principal centre of intellectual criticism of Irish membership of the EEC in the Accession Referendum of May 1972. Central to such criticism was the belief that what was then called the Common Market was intended to lead on to a European Monetary and Political Union under the political hegemony of what Dr Garret FitzGerald recently termed “The Big Three” EU Member States – Germany, France and Britain – as has broadly been happening since.

Emmett O’Connell repeated his criticisms of EMU at the time of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty which led to the establishment of the euro and he has written occasional press articles on this and related economic topics over the years. The core of his argument is the section of his pamphlet setting out “The case for Sovereign Money” on pages 12-14, as well as pages 22-26. The validity of what he wrote then, he believes, is confirmed by the current crisis of the eurozone and the fact that Ireland is unable to restore its lost economic competitiveness because of the abolition of the Irish pound and with it our ability to have any control over either the currency exchange rate or interest rates with a view to maximising Irish development and employment.

Nobel Economics Prizewinner Paul Krugman on “The Euro Trap”

On Monday May 3rd, the Irish Times carried an article by Nobel Economics Prizewinner Paul Krugman on “The Euro Trap”. Its main contention was that the euro-realists and euro-sceptics who had warned against the dangers of abolishing national currencies to form an EU currency union were being proved right by current events.

The austerity being imposed on Greece so that it can repay what it owes to German, French and other banks could be alleviated if Greece had its own drachma to devalue, thus helping to restore its economic competitiveness and enabling its government to use its own money to encourage domestic demand. Exactly the same point is true of Ireland.

This article was first carried as an op-ed piece in the New York Times last week. Since then Krugman has written the following related pieces on his blog, which may be of interest.


http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/04/default-devaluation-or-what/
The Conscience of a Liberal
Paul Krugman
Tuesday 4 May 2010
Default, Devaluation, Or What?

Is there anything more to say about Greece? Actually, I think so.

Observers like Charles Wyplosz, who point out that the adjustment being demanded of Greece is extraordinary and hard to see happening, are right. And yet .. one thing I haven’t seen pointed out sufficiently is that a debt restructuring, or even a complete cessation of debt service, wouldn’t do all that much to ease the burden.

Consider what Greece would get if it simply stopped paying any interest or principal on its debt. All it would have to do then is run a zero primary deficit – taking in as much in taxes as it spends on things other than interest on its debt. But here’s the thing: Greece is currently running a huge primary deficit – 8.5 percent of GDP in 2009. So even a complete debt default wouldn’t save Greece from the necessity of savage fiscal austerity.

It follows, then, that a debt restructuring wouldn’t help all that much – not unless you believe that getting forgiveness on much of Greece’s existing debt would make it possible to take on substantial new debt, which doesn’t seem very likely.

The point is that the only way to seriously reduce Greek pain would be to find a way to limit the costs of fiscal austerity to the Greek economy. And debt restructuring wouldn’t do that.

Devaluation would, if you could pull it off. I see that Vox has reposted the classic Eichengreen paper on why you can’t. I’ve already written that this argument, which I found extremely persuasive when first made, now seems to me less than watertight. But let me be a little more specific.

The way things are going, it looks quite possible that Greece will spiral into domestic as well as debt crisis, and be forced to take emergency measures. And that makes me think of Argentina in 2001. At the time, Argentina had the convertibility law, supposedly permanently pegging the peso to the dollar – and that was supposed to be irreversible for the same reasons the euro is supposed to be irreversible now. Namely, to repeal the law would require extensive legislative discussion, and any such discussion would set off destructive bank runs, hence there was no way to undo the fixed exchange rate.

But by late 2001 Argentina was a mess, with many emergency measures in place in an effort to contain the situation. These included the corralito, severe restrictions on bank withdrawals to contain bank runs – and one unintended consequence of all this was that the bank runs argument against suspending convertibility became moot.

Is it really impossible to see something similar happening in Greece? And if it does, might not other countries’ membership in the eurozone be called into question?


http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/01/why-devalue/
The Conscience of a Liberal
Paul Krugman
Saturday 1 May 2010
Why Devalue?

As the debate over possible departures from the euro heats up, there seems to a lot of confusion over the possible uses of devaluation. The main argument I’m hearing goes like this: since Greece’s debt is in euros, devaluing won’t relieve the debt burden – so it won’t help.

But that’s missing the point. True, devaluation wouldn’t reduce the debt burden. But it would reduce the macroeconomic costs of fiscal austerity.

Think for a moment about Greece’s predicament now, even if it were to default on its debt. It’s running a huge primary deficit, so even if it were to stop paying any debt service it would be forced to slash spending and/or raise taxes, to the tune of 8 or 9 percent of GDP.

This would have a massively contractionary effect on the Greek economy, leading to a surge in unemployment (and a further fall in revenues, making even more belt-tightening necessary).

Now, if Greece had its own currency, it could try to offset this contraction with an expansionary monetary policy – including a devaluation to gain export competitiveness. As long as it’s in the euro, however, Greece can do nothing to limit the macroeconomic costs of fiscal contraction.

And that’s why a devaluation would help – it wouldn’t reduce the need for fiscal adjustment, but it would reduce the costs associated with fiscal adjustment. As I argued yesterday, this difference is an important reason why Britain, with a primary deficit as large as Greece’s, isn’t in anything like the same amount of trouble.

Or to put it another way, exchange rate flexibility doesn’t solve fiscal problems by itself – but it makes solving such problems much easier.


“The Euro Trap”
Paul Krugman
New York Times, Thursday 29 April; reproduced in the Irish Times, Monday 3 May

Right now everyone is focused on public debt, which can make it seem as if this is a simple story of governments that couldn’t control their spending. But that’s only part of the story for Greece, much less for Portugal, and not at all the story for Spain.

The fact is that three years ago none of the countries now in or near crisis seemed to be in deep fiscal trouble. […] And all of the countries were attracting large inflows of foreign capital, largely because markets believed that membership in the euro zone made Greek, Portuguese and Spanish bonds safe investments.

Then came the global financial crisis. Those inflows of capital dried up; revenues plunged and deficits soared; and membership in the euro, which had encouraged markets to love the crisis countries not wisely but too well, turned into a trap.

What’s the nature of the trap? During the years of easy money, wages and prices in the crisis countries rose much faster than in the rest of Europe. Now that the money is no longer rolling in, those countries need to get costs back in line.

But that’s a much harder thing to do now than it was when each European nation had its own currency.

Back then, costs could be brought in line by adjusting exchange rates … Now that Greece and Germany share the same currency … the only way to reduce Greek relative costs is through some combination of German inflation and Greek deflation. And since Germany won’t accept inflation, deflation it is.

The problem is that deflation – falling wages and prices – is always and everywhere a deeply painful process. It invariably involves a prolonged slump with high unemployment. And it also aggravates debt problems, both public and private, because incomes fall while the debt burden doesn’t.

[…]

All this is exactly what the euro-sceptics feared. Giving up the ability to adjust exchange rates, they warned, would invite future crises. And it has.

So what will happen to the euro? Until recently, most analysts, myself included, considered a euro breakup basically impossible … But if the crisis countries are forced into default, they’ll probably face severe bank runs anyway, forcing them into emergency measures like temporary restrictions on bank withdrawals. This would open the door to euro exit.

So is the euro itself in danger? In a word, yes. If European leaders don’t start acting much more forcefully, providing Greece with enough help … a chain reaction that starts with a Greek default and ends up wreaking much wider havoc looks all too possible.

[…] What the crisis really demonstrates, however, is the dangers of putting yourself in a policy straitjacket. When they joined the euro, the governments of Greece, Portugal and Spain denied themselves the ability to do some bad things, like printing too much money; but they also denied themselves the ability to respond flexibly to events.

And when crisis strikes, governments need to be able to act. That’s what the architects of the euro forgot […]

Greek Bail-Out Crisis

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/financialcrisis/7591027/Greek-aid-in-doubt-as-German-professors-prepare-court-challenge.html
Greek aid in doubt as German professors prepare court challenge
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard
The Daily Telegraph
15 Apr 2010

A quartet of German professors is to preparing to challenge the EU-IMF rescue for Greece at Germany’s constitutional court as soon as the mechanism is activated, claiming that it violates the ‘no-bail-out’ clause of the EU Treaties.


http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/461663a0-5613-11df-b835-00144feab49a.html
Europe’s choice is to integrate or disintegrate
Wolfgang Münchau
Financial Times
Monday 3 May 2010

The aim of the rescue package agreed for Greece cannot conceivably have been to prevent a default… the numbers do not add up. The main purpose I can detect is to reverse the rise in Greek bond yields and stop contagion.

[…]

A debt restructuring will eventually be necessary, however, because Greece’s debt to gross domestic product ratio is going to rise from its current 125 per cent to about 140-150 per cent during the adjustment period. Without restructuring, Greece will end up austere, compliant, and crippled.

The decision to take Greece out of the capital markets for three years will prevent immediate ruin but has only a marginal impact on the country’s future solvency. The underlying assumption of the agreement is that Greece can sustain austerity beyond the time horizon of the accord, without falling into a black hole. The latter is particularly optimistic. Standard & Poor’s, the rating agency, last week estimated that Greece would not return to its 2009 level of nominal GDP until 2017.

[…]

On my estimate, the total size of a liquidity backstop for Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and possibly Italy could add up to somewhere between €500bn ($665bn, £435bn) and €1,000bn. All those countries are facing increases in interest rates at a time when they are either in recession or just limping out of one. The private sector in some of those countries is simply not viable at those higher rates.

…three things are required if the eurozone is to survive in the medium term: a crisis resolution system, better fiscal policy co-ordination, and policies to reduce intra-eurozone imbalances. But this is only the minimum necessary to get through the next few years. Beyond that, the eurozone will almost certainly need both an embryonic fiscal union and a single European bond.

I used to think that such constructions would be desirable, albeit politically unrealistic. Now I believe they are without alternative, as the experiment of a monetary union without political union has failed. The EU is thus about to confront a historic choice between integration and disintegration.

Germany can be relied on to resist every one of those measures. In the meantime, European leaders will treat each new crisis with the only instrument they have available: an injection of borrowed liquidity. But this instrument has a finite lifespan. If it is not blocked by popular unrest, it will be blocked by constitutional lawyers.

… There can really be no doubt about what the “no bail-out” rule was intended to mean. It meant that Greece should not be supported. The EU had to resort to some unseemly legal trickery to argue that advancing junior loans at a massive scale to an effectively insolvent country does not constitute a bail-out…

So what is the endgame of the eurozone’s multiple crises? For Greece it will be debt restructuring, a polite term for negotiated default. The broader outcome is more difficult to predict: it will either be deep reform of the system or a break-up.

The real costs of eurozone membership

The article below from the Financial Times points to the lack of public debate across the EU on the real implications of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty’s proposal to abolish national currencies and replace them with the euro.

In Ireland’s 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty the main thrust of public debate was on the Abortion Protocol attached to that Treaty.

There was virtually no discussion of the economics involved, apart from the fact that it would make it easier for Irish tourists to go on holiday on the continent and that it would give us permanently low German-level interest rates! The latter in due course helped impel our early-2000s borrowing binge.

The article mentions Professor Albrecht Schachtschneider and his colleagues, who launched a constitutional challenge to Germany’s ratification of the Maastricht Treaty at the time. This led to the Court’s well-known Brunner judgement, which laid down the constitutional principles governing Germany’s adherence to Economic and Monetary Union.

My colleagues and I had the pleasure of welcoming Professor Schachtschneider when he came to Ireland last September to show solidarity with those urging a No vote to the Lisbon Treaty.

We wish him and his colleagues every success if they now take action in the German Constitutional Court against the breach of the EU Treaties which a financial bail-out of Greece or any other EU State in face of the current bond-market crisis would constitute.


http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bff9757a-522d-11df-8b09-00144feab49a.html
Greek crisis begets a German backlash
David Marsh
Financial Times
Wednesday 28 April 2010
(The writer is senior adviser to Soditic-CBIP LLP, chairman of SCCO International and author of “The Euro – The Politics of the New Global Currency”)

When Josef Joffe, then foreign editor of the German daily Süddeutsche Zeitung, wrote a 4,000-word essay in December 1997 attacking the planned formation of the European single currency, he published it first in English, in the New York Review of Books. “Never in the history of democracy have so few debated so little about so momentous a transformation in the lives of men and women,” noted Mr Joffe. As if to confirm his point, the article appeared in an abridged German translation in the Süddeutsche Zeitung more than a month later, unobtrusively buried in a weekend supplement.

The episode illustrates past barriers to plain speaking about economic and monetary union (EMU). Many ordinary Germans always feared the euro would be less stable than the D-Mark. Yet, reflecting postwar belief that German interests ineluctably overlapped with Europe’s, there was little discussion of the risks. This went beyond Germany. One senior Dutch central banker, now retired, says most European governments – including his own – agreed the Maastricht treaty 20 years ago without understanding what they had signed into law.

In April 1998, Germany’s parliament voted through the euro with only minimal opposition. Now, the German-in-the-street is making up for lost time…

There is an air of déjà vu… four German professors who launched an unsuccessful anti-euro lawsuit at the constitutional court in 1998, are preparing fresh legal action. Their claims of infringements to the EMU rules, in particular over the “no bail-out clause” preventing joint payment of weaker states’ debts, have a much greater chance of success this time.

As Greece approaches a possible debt restructuring and even a euro exit, questions are due on why warning signals went ignored that weaker eurozone countries were building up unsustainable borrowings…

[…]

Inadequate discussion of the eurozone’s problems has been particularly acute on the issue of whether monetary union required political union. Both the Bundesbank and Helmut Kohl, the former German chancellor, suggested in 1991 that without political union, EMU would eventually fail… In 2006 Otmar Issing, former chief economist at the Bundesbank and then the ECB, said monetary union “can work and survive … without fully fledged political union”. Now Mr Issing says: “In the 1990s many economists – I was among them – warned that starting monetary union without having established a political union was putting the cart before the horse.”

Leading German figures never explained that large deficits in countries such as Greece would eventually impinge on Germany’s own finances. Germany, the main surplus country, has inevitably become the largest creditor of the eurozone’s heavily indebted peripheral nations. As Mr Issing said in 1999, the no bail-out clause was meant to prevent the “negative external effects of national misbehaviour” from spilling over elsewhere. In fact, German taxpayers will have to pay for Greece: directly, through emergency government loans; indirectly, through supporting German banks that will be hit by a Greek debt restructuring; or, conceivably, both.

This is one of many costly facts about monetary union now bursting disagreeably to the surface.