• Recent Posts

  • Really Simple Syndication

     Subscribe in a reader

  • Enter your email address to follow this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

    Join 46 other subscribers

  • Twitter@NatPlat

  • People’s Movement Ireland

    People’s Movement Ireland

  • Archives

  • Posts by Category

  • Blog Stats

    • 44,457 hits

☘Explanatory document on Lisbon

Posted on 9 Deireadh an tSamhraidh, 2009 by NationalPlatform.Org

Facts on the Lisbon Treaty

Millions of Europeans support us: By voting No we remain full members of the EU and of the euro currency based on the existing Nice Treaty, but we reject the proposed Lisbon Treaty as a step too far. Millions of  our fellow Europeans who are being denied referendums on Lisbon by their politicians are hoping that we will say No again for their sakes. We can thereby open the way for a better Treaty for a better and more democratic Europe.

The economic crisis: All 27 EU Members are in economic crisis. Ireland is worse than most because of  the borrowing binge, housing bubble and Bank bail-outs which were encouraged by the same golden circle of  politicians and bankers as are now bringing us Lisbon Two. The crisis makes Lisbon’s model of a deregulated, privatised, let-it-rip EU economy quite out-of-date.  Lisbon’s proposal to give the Big States from 50-100% more voting power in the EU, while halving Ireland’s voting power to 0.8% would be economically disastrous for us in face of the economic crisis, as Brussels, Frankfurt  and the Big EU States insist on savage cut-backs  being imposed on the Irish economy.

We remain full EU members: There is no question of Ireland being sidelined or pushed out of the EU or the euro-currency if we stand by our No to Lisbon. As Ireland’s EU Commissioner Charlie McCreevy said in Hot Press last December:

“There is no provision in the existing treaties to isolate anybody. There is no provision to throw out anybody, unless unanimously all the existing members of the club agreed to throw you out. And I doubt, now or in the future, any Irish Government is going to unanimously agree to throw themselves out.”

Exactly the same Lisbon Treaty: Not a dot or comma of the Lisbon Treaty will be changed for Lisbon Two. If Lisbon comes into force it will be interpreted by the EU Court of Justice and not on the basis of political declarations by the EU Prime Ministers and Presidents.  These do not change anything in the Treaty and are not legally binding as part of EU law. Promises of changes to suit Ireland in some future EU Treaty cannot pull back on anything in the Lisbon Treaty once it is in force. The EU Prime Ministers state that they “will clarify but not change either the content or the application of the Treaty of Lisbon”, which only the EU Court can decide on (Summit Conclusions 19-6-2009).

As pro-Lisbon journalist James Downey has written: “The antis are right about one thing, if one thing only. Any guarantees we may get on their concerns will be irrelevant, or worthless, or both.” (Irish Independent, 21-3-2009)

Overturning the people’s vote: The Lisbon Treaty is the new legal form of the EU Constitution which French and Dutch voters rejected in their 2005 referendums.  Irish voters rejected it in last year’s referendum by 53% to 47%.  All genuine democrats, including Yes-side voters, should respect that vote as the French and Dutch Governments did.  Respecting it would have meant Taoiseach Brian Cowen telling his EU partners that Ireland could not ratify Lisbon because the Irish people had voted No to it, so  there was no point in their continuing to ratify it as EU Treaties must be unanimous. Instead Taoiseach Cowen and Foreign Minister Martin told the other EU Governments on the morning of last year’s count to ignore their own people’s vote and to  continue with ratifying Lisbon.They persuaded their EU colleagues that they could get the Irish people to overturn their democratic No vote  in a second referendum on exactly the same Treaty, if they got enough support from France, Germany etc. in the form of statements about Ireland’s concerns, even though the Treaty is unchanged.

Turning the EU into a State: Lisbon would be a giant step in turning the EU into a supranational Federal-style State, in which Ireland would effectively be reduced to regional or provincial status.  It would give Government Ministers and the Big EU States huge new powers, while taking power away from ordinary citizens across the EU, and from the National Parliaments they elect. Because of our Constitution, only Ireland is being allowed a vote on it. Only we Irish can save democracy in the EU by refusing to allow ourselves be pressurised into overturning our rejection of Lisbon in 2008. If we vote No again in Lisbon Two we hold the door open to our fellow countrymen and women in Northern Ireland and give them the chance of having a say in a UK referendum next year.

Denying citizens a vote: France’s President Sarkozy and  EU Commissioner Charlie McCreevy have admitted that if Lisbon were put to referendum in other EU countries their voters would reject it too.  Although opinion polls show that people in most Member States want to decide for themselves whether they should be put under an EU Constitution which would override their National Constitutions, the EU Prime Ministers refused to allow referendums. This does not bode well for the future of democracy in the EU.

A UK Referendum: There is now a race in time between the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which would greatly increase the power of  the Big States and the  Brussels Commission in the EU, and the coming to office of a  new Government in Britain by next May.  Labour’s Gordon Brown broke Tony Blair’s promise to give the British people a referendum.  David Cameron’s  policy is to hold a referendum on Lisbon in the UK and recommend a No vote to it to the British people – so long as  we Irish do not change our No vote of last year and thereby bring Lisbon and the new undemocratic EU it would create into being for all 27 EU Member States first.

These are the main reasons why Lisbon is a bad Treaty for Ireland and for the EU.  It would –

1. Be  a power-grab by the Big States for control of the EU. At present EU laws are made by a simple majority of Member States (14 out of 27), so long as  between them  they have  a qualified majority of 255 votes out of 345. Under this Nice Treaty system the Big States have 29 votes each and Ireland has 7, one quarter of each Big State. Under Lisbon future EU laws would be made by 55% of Member States, i.e. 15 out of 27, so long as they have 65% of the total EU population between them. By basing EU law-making primarily on population size, the Lisbon Treaty would double Germany’s relative voting strength on the EU Council of Ministers from its present 8% of the total votes to 17% on a population  basis, and increase  France’s, Britain’s and Italy’s by half,  from 8% to 12%  – while halving Ireland’s vote from 2% to 0.8% (Art.16, Treaty on European Union / TEU).  How does having 0.8% of a vote in making EU laws put us “at the heart of Europe”?  Taoiseach Brian Cowen’s “guarantees” do not explain how having half as much influence in the EU as Ireland has today would induce other Member States to listen to our concerns on unemployment and help to resolve the economic crisis  in the interest of Irish companies, workers and farmers. (*See Note 1 below on the  voting rules for making EU laws)

2. Copperfasten the Laval and related judgements of the EU Court of Justice, which  put the competition rules of the EU market  above the right of Trade Unions to enforce pay standards higher than the minimum wage for migrant workers. At the same time Lisbon would give the EU full control of immigration policy (Art.79 TFEU). This combination threatens the pay and working conditions of many Irish people. A Protocol in a new Treaty different from Lisbon would be needed to set aside the recent Laval, Rüffert and other EU Court judgements, but the EU Prime Ministers refused that.

3. Permit the post-Lisbon EU to impose Europe-wide taxes directly on us for the first time without need of further Treaties or referendums (Art.311 TFEU). This could be any kind of tax – income tax, sales tax, property tax –  so long as it was  unanimously agreed by EU Governments. If Lisbon were to be ratified,  Government Ministers would have every incentive to agree to give the EU much increased “own resources” by introducing its own taxes to finance the many new functions the EU would obtain under the Treaty.

4. Amend the existing treaties to  give the EU exclusive power as regards rules on foreign direct investment (Arts.206-7 TFEU) and give the Court of Justice the power to order the harmonisation of national indirect taxes it it decides that they cause a“distortion of competition” in the EU market (Art.113 TFEU).  This amendment and the new Protocol No. 27 on the Internal Market and Competition would  strengthen the hand of the Court in using the EU’s internal market rules to subvert Ireland’s low 12.5% company tax rate, which is the principal reason foreign firms come to Ireland and stay here when they come. Compare Germany’s 30% company  tax rate. Commission plans for a harmonised tax base in the EU,  the precursor of harmonised tax rates, have been put on the back-burner until after Lisbon Two for fear they would alarm Irish voters.

5. The Commission, which is appointed not elected, has the monopoly of proposing all European laws. The Lisbon Treaty would abolish our present right to “propose” and decide who Ireland’s Commissioner is, by replacing it with a right to make”suggestions” only, leaving it up to the incoming Commission President to decide (Art.17.7 TEU; cf.Art.214 TEC). Our No vote of last year secured us a commitment to a permanent Commissioner, but what is the point of every EU State continuing to have its own Commissioner post-Lisbon when it can no longer decide who that Commissioner will be?  Under the present Nice Treaty Ireland would continue to decide who should be our Commissioner, and can continue to have an Irish Commissioner indefinitely as well.  (*See Note 2 below explaining how).

6. Give the legally new EU which  it would establish its own State Constitution, which would be superior to the Irish and other national Constitutions. Lisbon would abolish the existing European Community which Ireland joined in 1973 and transfer all of its powers and institutions to the new post-Lisbon Union.  It would give the European Union its own legal personality for the first time, which would be constitutionally separate from and superior to its 27 Member States, so that it could sign international Treaties with other States in all areas of its powers (Arts.1 and 47 TEU; Declaration No.17 concerning Primacy). This post-Lisbon EU would have the same name but would be constitutionally very different from the present EU, which was founded by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.

In constitutional terms Lisbon would thereby turn Ireland into a regional or provincial state within this new Federal-style Union, with the EU’s Constitution and laws having legal primacy over the Irish Constitution and laws in any cases of conflict between the two. The EU Court of Justice, as the Supreme Court of the new post-Lisbon Union,  would decide such conflicts. Constitutionally and in the eyes of others this would be the end of Ireland’s position as an independent sovereign State in the international community of States. Although we would retain some of the trappings of independent statehood from pre-Lisbon days, in reality we would be more like a regional or provincial state such as Bavaria inside Federal Germany or Massachussetts or Texas inside the USA. From the inside the EU would seem to be based on a Treaty between States, but from the outside it would look like a State itself. The only major power of a State which the post-Lisbon European Union would lack would be the power to force its members to go to war against their will, although they could go to war voluntarily on the EU’s behalf.   (*See Notes 3 and 5 below on the constitutional revolution the Lisbon Treaty would bring about)

7. Turn us all into real citizens for the first time of this new post-Lisbon European Union, owing obedience to its laws and loyalty to its authority over and above our obedience and loyalty to Ireland and the Irish Constitution and laws in the event of any conflict between the two.  One can only be a citizen of a State. and all States must have citizens. Article 9 TEU would give us an “additional” EU citizenship, on top of our Irish citizenship.  This would  be a real EU citizenship for the first time, with associated citizens’ rights and duties, and would be quite different from the notional or symbolical EU “citizenship” of today.  We would still retain our Irish citizenship, but it would be subordinate to our EU citizenship in any case of conflict between the two, as is the case with citizens of such Federal States as Germany, the USA, Switzerland,  Canada. The EU Court of Justice would decide on any such conflicts. (*See Note 4 below)

8. Give the EU Court of Justice the power to decide our rights as EU citizens by making the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding for the first time (Art.6 TEU).  The Charter includes such rights as free speech, the right to fair trial, the right to life, the rights of the child, the right to strike, property rights etc. – all of them rights we already have under the Irish Constitution, but which it would  fall to the EU Court of Justice, not Ireland’s courts, to interpret and decide for people in their capacity as  citizens of the post-Lisbon EU if Lisbon should be ratified. This would  enable the EU judges to  use its case-law to lay down a uniform standard of rights for the 500 million citizens of the post-Lisbon Union in the name of  a common EU citizenship in the years and decades to come.  It would open the possibility of clashes with national human rights standards in sensitive areas where Member States differ from one another at present, e.g. trial by jury, the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, habeas corpus, the legalisation of hard drugs, euthanasia, abortion, labour law, succession law, marriage law, children’s rights etc. Ireland’s Supreme Court and the  Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg would no longer have the final say on what our rights are.

9. Ireland would lose the national veto it has at present by handing over to the EU the power to make laws binding on us in 32 new policy areas, including public services, crime, justice and policing, immigration, energy, transport, tourism, sport, culture, public health, the EU budget and international measures on  climate change (Art.191 TFEU).   The Dáil and Irish voters who elect the Dáil would no longer decide laws or policy for the areas transferred. (*See Note 6 below on the respective law-making powers of the EU and its Member States after Lisbon.)

10. Reduce the power of National Parliaments to make laws in  relation to 49 policy areas or matters, and increase the influence of the European Parliament in making EU laws in 19 new  areas (See euabc.eu/Heeger II for the two detailed lists). Lisbon would entitle one-third of the National Parliaments or 1 million EU citizens to request the EU Commission to propose a new EU law or to abandon a proposed law, but the Commission need not accede to any such request (Art.11.4 TEU; Protocol No. 2 on Subsidiarity and Proportionality). Lisbon underlines the implicitly subordinate role of National Parliaments in the institutional structure of  the post-Lisbon Union by laying down that “National Parliaments contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union” by various means that are set out in Art.12 TEU. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), who at present  are “representatives of the peoples of the Member States brought together in the Community” (Art.189 TEC), would under Lisbon become “representatives of the Union’s citizens” (Art.14 TEU).  This change illustrates the constitutional revolution Lisbon would bring about.

11. Be a self-amending Treaty which would permit the EU Prime Ministers and Presidents to shift most remaining EU policy areas where unanimity is required and a national veto still exists – e.g. on tax harmonisation   –  to  qualified majority voting on the Council of Ministers, without need of further EU Treaties or referendums (Art.48.7 TEU).  In  addition, the so-called “Flexibility Clause”, which allows the EU to take action  and adopt measures to attain one of the EU’s objectives even if “the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers,” would be extended by Lisbon to all areas of the Treaty and not just the internal market rules as before (Art.352 TFEU). This would open the floodgates to more political integration, i.e. centralisation,  by means of this article, which is already widely used.

12. Enable the 27 EU Prime Ministers and Presidents to appoint an EU President for up to five years without allowing voters any say as to who he or she would be – thereby abolishing the present six-monthly rotating EU presidencies (Art.15.5 TEU).  Appointment rather than democratic election to this and other top  EU jobs, such as the proposed EU “Foreign Minister”/ High Representative (Art.21.3 TEU),  typifies the undemocratic nature of the proposed Lisbon Constitution.  It is the Prime Ministers and Presidents of the Big States who would have the key say in these appointments because of the big increase in their voting power under Lisbon.

13. Militarize the EU further, requiring Member States “progressively to improve their military capabilities” (Art.42.3 TEU) and to aid and assist other Member States experiencing armed attack “by all the means in their power” (Art.42.7 TEU).

Explanatory Notes

*Note 1: Voting to make EU laws: When Ireland joined the then EEC in 1973 Germany, France, Britain and Italy had 10 votes each in making European laws and Ireland had 3 – one-third that of the Big States.  Under the present Nice Treaty the Big States have 29 votes each and Ireland has 7 – one  quarter of the Big States. Under Lisbon Germany’s votes would be 20 times Ireland’s, for it has 80 million people as against Ireland’s 4 million, and France, Britain and Italy, with their average populations of  60 million,  would each have 15 times more votes than Ireland.  Germany and France between them have one-third of the EU’s population of near 500 million. Under the Lisbon rules they would need only two small countries to vote with them to block any EU law they did not like. (The present voting rules are set out in Art. 205 TEC and the Declaration on EU Enlargement. The Lisbon rules are in Art. 238 TFEU).

*Note 2: Keeping Ireland’s Commissioner under Nice: The Nice Treaty requires the number of Commissioners to be fewer than the number of Member States from 2009, without specifying a number, and any change must be agreed unanimously (Art.4, Protocol on Enlargement). This can be done by reducing the number of Commissioners from 27 to 26, which would mean Ireland would lose its Commissioner once every 135 years. Alternatively, the country whose national is given the job of EU Foreign Minister could be represented by that person on the Commission. So there would be no need for any country to lose a Commissioner under Nice, unless they were compensated by having one of their nationals given this more important job instead.

*Note 3: Ireland’s proposed Constitutional Amendment: The first sentence of the proposed Constitutional Amendment which Irish voters rejected last summer and which they are being asked to change their minds on in October, recognises that Lisbon would establish a legally new European Union which would have the same name but would politically and constitutionally be very different from the present Nice/Maastricht Treaty-based EU:

“The State may ratify the Treaty of Lisbon signed at Lisbon on the 13th day of December 2007, and  may be a  member of the European Union established by virtue of that Treaty.    No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State that are necessitated by membership of the European Union, or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by  the said European Union or by institutions thereof, or by bodies competent under the treaties referred  to in this section, from having the force of law in the State.” (emphasis added)

*Note 4: EU Citizenship: Under the present Nice Treaty EU citizenship is stated to “complement” national citizenship (Art.17 TEC). This is purely notional or symbolical, for  the present EU is not a State, and one can only be a citizen of a State. Neither does the present EU have legal personality, so that it cannot have individuals as members. All that would change with Lisbon, which would make citizenship of the constitutionally new Union “additional to” national citizenship (Art. 9 TEU). This would be a real Federal citizenship with associated rights and duties vis-à-vis the new EU, with all the implications of that. In classical Federations such as the USA or 19th century Germany, both sovereignty and dual citizenships are divided between the federal and the regional / provincial levels.

*Note 5:  Lisbon’s Constitutional Revolution: The Lisbon Treaty proposes to “constitute” or establish a legally new European Union while retaining the same name, by amending the two existing European Treaties rather than by replacing these completely with a formally titled “Constitution”, as the Treaty which the French and Dutch  rejected in their 2005 referendums sought to do (See the first sentence of the  Irish Constitutional Amendment above and Arts.1 and 47 TEU for proof of this).   When the French and Dutch rejected this Constitutional Treaty, the EU Prime Ministers and Presidents decided to get a Federal-style EU Constitution through indirectly rather than directly without using the word “Constitution”, for they realised that talk of EU Constitutions alarmed people and made too obvious the constitutional revolution being proposed. The result is the Lisbon Treaty.

Because the Lisbon Treaty consists of a long series of amendments to the two existing European Treaties, one can only understand what it would do by referring to the latter Treaties as they would be if amended by Lisbon. This document does that.  The Constitution of the proposed  post-Lisbon European Union would therefore be the two existing European Treaties as they would be when and if they are amended by the Lisbon Treaty.  These would be the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union (TFEU). The two Treaties would have the same legal value (Art.1 TEU).  The second of these, the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union, would be the new name for the present second Treaty, the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), for  Lisbon would abolish the existing European Community which  Ireland joined in 1973.

In legal content and effect the Lisbon Treaty is virtually 100% the same as the Constitutional Treaty which the French and Dutch rejected. Both Treaties would abolish the existing European Community and the Nice/Maastricht-based European Union and establish in their place a constitutionally new European Union with its own legal personality, which would be legally separate from and superior to its Member States for the first time.  Lisbon, like its predecessor, would then confer a real “additional” EU citizenship, with accompanying EU citizens’ rights and duties, on the 500 million citizens of the 27 Member States, without  most of them being aware of it or being allowed any direct say on it.  At the same time the same name, “The European Union”, would be retained for the post-Lisbon EU as for the existing Nice/Maastricht-based EU, even though the new Union’s constitutional-political character would be fundamentally changed.

Those pushing this great deception hope that the media and ordinary citizens  in the  27 Member States  will not notice the constitutional revolution which Lisbon seeks to bring about –  for the EU itself and for its Member States – until after it is accomplished.   People are to be sleep-walked into becoming citizens of a Federal-style EU without knowing it.  Hence the decision of the EU Prime Ministers and Presidents in 2005 to avoid referendums on this proposed constitutional/political  revolution at all costs, in case people might be alerted and protest.

* Note 6: EU powers and Member State powers: In some policy areas the EU has exclusive powers to make laws for its Member States, so that they can no longer legislate for those areas (Art.3 TFEU). These areas are the customs Union, competition rules for the internal market, interest rate and exchange rate policy for  the eurozone countries, fisheries conservation, the common commercial policy and trade treaties.  In most policy areas the EU exercises shared powers with its Member States.  These areas are the internal market, some areas of social policy, economic, social  and territorial cohesion, environment, consumer protection, transport, trans-European networks, energy, the area of freedom, security and justice, and common safety concerns in public health as defined in the Treaty.  In these areas of shared law-making it is the EU, not the Member States, which decides what can be done. The Lisbon Treaty lays down: “Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its competence” or “to the extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence” (Art.2 TFEU).  The EU also has independent powers in relation to research, technological development, space, development cooperation and humanitarian aid, without the right to inhibit Member State activity in these areas (Art. 4.3 TFEU).  Lisbon also confers on the EU supporting, coordinating or supplementing powers in relation to the actions of Member States  in protecting and improving human health,  industry, culture, tourism, education, youth, sport and vocational training, civil protection and administrative cooperation (Art.6 TFEU). In addition the EU has its Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy (Arts.21-46 TEU). It is safe to say that there is no area of State law-making or public policy that would not be either decided, influenced or touched by the EU’s powers after Lisbon. It is unsurprising therefore that  the EU now decides the majority of legal acts for its Member States each year. (For a full  list of the specific powers transferred to the EU level see  euabc.eu – legal analysis  by Klaus Heeger, II)

*    *    *

This document has been prepared by The National Platform EU Research and Information Centre, 24 Crawford Ave., Dublin  9; Tel: 01-8305792; Web-site: nationalplatform.org;  Director Anthony Coughlan.  It has been checked for legal accuracy with authorities on European and Irish constitutional law.

Please feel free to  use and adapt it as you see fit, without any need of  reference to or acknowledgement of its source.  Please photocopy it and distribute it to others so as to  inform people how Ireland’s pro-Lisbon politicians – some wittingly, some unwittingly –  are out to do profound damage to our political and economic interests in the EU by seeking to overturn last year’s Lisbon Treaty referendum result.

We are an entirely voluntary body and depend on citizens’ donations for our work. To help this, and to enable us spread this information more widely, please send what donation you can to our address above, making cheques out to Bank of Ireland Account No. 30081817.
For useful  non-partisan material on the Lisbon Treaty and all aspects of  the EU, see the Dictionary/Lexicon  of EU terms and associated data and linked internet items at euabc.eu

July 2009

Filed under: Lisbon Treaty | Tagged: , , , | Leave a comment »

☘Summary of 13 things the Lisbon Treaty would do

Posted on 9 Deireadh an tSamhraidh, 2009 by NationalPlatform.Org

The Lisbon Treaty Re-run – 13 Key Facts

On Friday 2 October we will be voting on exactly the same Lisbon Treaty as Irish voters rejected last year. Not a dot or comma of it will have been changed. These are the main things Lisbon would lead to:

1. A RADICAL SHIFT OF CONTROL TO THE BIG STATES OVER THE EU: Lisbon would halve Ireland’s vote in making EU laws from 2% to 0.9%, while doubling Germany’s vote to 16% and increasing the vote of France, Britain and Italy from 8% each to 12% each. Lisbon would thereby base EU law-making in future on exact population size, just as in a single unified State.

At present EU laws are made on the basis of a “double majority” system – a simple majority of the 27 EU States (14 or more), as long as between them they have a weighted majority of 255 out of a total of 345 votes (Art.205 TEC*; Declaration on Enlargement). Under this system the Big States have 29 votes each and Ireland has 7.

Under Lisbon EU laws would be made by a majority of States (at least 55%, 15 or more), as long as they have 65% of the total EU population between them (Art.16 TEU). This change would double Germany’s voting power in making EU laws from its present 8% to 16%, increase Britain’s, France’s and Italy’s from their present 8% each to 12% each, while halving Ireland’s vote from 2% to 0.9% on the latest official EU population figures for 2009.

Instead of the Big States having 4 times Ireland’s voting weight, as now, under Lisbon Germany would have 18 times and France, Britain and Italy 15 times each. The Government’s White Paper writes untruthfully when it speaks of the “change to a double majority voting system in the Council” (p.44). A double majority of States and weighted votes already exists for making EU laws. What Lisbon does is to replace the existing system of weighted votes, which already recognises the larger size of the Big States, by exact population size as the key criterion for future EU law-making – so hugely advantaging the Big EU States at the expense of the small.

The Big Four EU States would between them have half the voting power on the EU Council of Ministers under the post-Lisbon voting rules, as compared with one-third of the weighted votes they have at present.

The new Lisbon-based voting system would also make it much easier for Germany, France and the Brussels Commission to impose sanctions on Ireland, up to and including limitless fines, under the rules of the Eurozone if we fail to get our 12%-of-GDP budget deficit down to the 3% target level for the Eurozone, according to whatever time-limit they should decide.

At present a special majority of two-thirds of the weighted votes of the Eurozone countries is needed to impose an enforcement procedure and sanctions on Eurozone countries that are running excessive budget deficits (Arts.104 and 122 TEC). Under Lisbon, 8 of the 16 Eurozone States, excluding the delinquent State (viz. 55% of the 16), could impose sanctions on a country running what they decide is an excessive deficit – as long as they have 65% of the 300 million Eurozone population between them. The State with the excessive deficit does not have a vote (Arts.126 and 238 TFEU; Protocol No.12 on the Excessive Deficit Procedure). Germany and France between them have nearly half the population of the Eurozone.

If we ratify Lisbon we will thereby be creating an iron rod to be laid across our backs by Germany, France and the Brussels Commission with regard to our budget deficits and general Government finances over the crucial next few years.

2. LOSING THE RIGHT TO DECIDE IRELAND’S COMMISSIONER: Lisbon would abolish our present right to “propose” and decide who Ireland’s Commissioner is (Art 214 TEC), by replacing it with a right to make”suggestions” only, for the incoming Commission President and the Big States to decide (Art.17.7 TEU).

The EU Prime Ministers have promised each State a Commissioner for the time being, but what is the point of us continuing to have an Irish Commissioner post-Lisbon when the Irish Government can no longer decide who that person would be? The Government White Paper makes no mention of this shift from a bottom-up to a top-down appointment process of deciding the members of the Commission.

This change in the mode of deciding on EU Commissioners is the reason why the Big Four EU States were willing to consider losing their own national Commissioner for five years out of every 15 under Lisbon, because they knew that they would have the decisive say in appointing all the other Commissioners through the incoming Commission President, whom they would have the key role in appointing.

Under Nice we can continue to have a permanent Commissioner on a 26-plus-one basis, as Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt recently suggested, and Ireland would continue, moreover, to decide who he or she will be. Under Nice we also have a veto on any change in the number of Commissioners. Under Lisbon we have no such veto.

3. GIVING THE EU THE CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF A STATE: Lisbon would abolish the European Community which Ireland joined in 1973 and replace it with a legally new European Union in the constitutional form of an EU Federation. This post-Lisbon EU would for the first time be legally fully separate from and superior to its 27 Member States, would sign international treaties with other States in all areas of its powers and would make half or more of our laws each year (Arts.1 and 47 TEU; Declaration 17 concerning Primacy). This is quite evident also from the second sentence of the Irish Constitutional Amendment which is set out in the 28th Amendment of the Constitution Bill, and can be ontained free from Post Offices, Garda stations and Libraries.

In constitutional terms Lisbon would thereby turn Ireland into a regional or provincial state within this new Federal-style European Union, with the EU’s Constitution and laws having legal primacy over the Irish Constitution and laws in any cases of conflict between the two. Ireland would thus formally cease to be a sovereign independent State in its own right in the international community of States, and become like a provincial state inside an EU Federation.

One illustration of the constitutional revolution which Lisbon would bring about is that it would make MEPs, who under the current treaties are “representatives of the peoples of the States brought together in the Community” (Art.189 TEC), into “representatives of the Union’s citizens” (Art.14 TEU).

4. MAKING US INTO REAL EU CITIZENS, WITH CITIZENS’ RIGHTS AND DUTIES VIS-A-VIS THE POST-LISBON EUROPEAN UNION WHICH WOULD HAVE PRIMACY OVER OUR RIGHTS AND DUTIES AS IRISH CITIZENS: Lisbon would confer on us an “additional” citizenship of the constitutionally Federal post-Lisbon European Union, owing obedience to its laws and loyalty to its authority over and above our duty of obedience and loyalty to Ireland and the Irish Constitution and laws in the event of any conflict between the two (Art.9 TEU).

This would be quite different from the notional or symbolic EU citizenship that people speak of today, because Lisbon would transfer the law-making powers of the European Community to the constitutionally new Union which Lisbon would establish, and the Community would be then legally abolished. As real EU citizens for the first time, we would be subject to the refounded Union’s laws and would be expected to give our citizens’ loyalty to the authority of the constitutionally new post-Lisbon Union.

One can only be a citizen of a State and all States must have citizens. The Irish people were not that happy when they were citizens of the UK State from 1800 to 1921. Although as citizens of the post-Lisbon Federal EU we would still keep our Irish citizenship, this would be subordinate to our EU citizenship and to the rights and duties attaching to that in any cases of conflict between the two (Art.9 TEU; Declaration 17 concerning Primacy).

5. THE EU COURT OF JUSTICE WOULD DECIDE OUR RIGHTS AS EU CITIZENS: Lisbon would give the EU Court of Justice the power to decide our human rights by making the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding for the first time (Art.6 TEU). This would give power to the EU judges to lay down a uniform standard of rights for the 500 million citizens of the post-Lisbon Union in the name of their common EU citizenship in the years and decades to come.

This would open the possibility of clashes with national human rights standards in sensitive areas where Member States differ from one another at present, e.g. inheritance and property rights, trial by jury, the presumption of innocence, habeas corpus, legalising hard drugs, abortion, euthanasia, labour law, marriage law, children’s rights etc. Ireland’s Supreme Court and the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights would no longer have the final say on what our fundamental rights are.

6. ABOLISHING THE NATIONAL VETO: Lisbon would abolish the national veto which Ireland has at present in over 30 new policy areas by handing over to the EU the power to make laws binding on us as regards public services, crime, justice, policing, immigration, energy, transport, tourism, sport, culture, public health, the EU budget, international moves on climate change etc.

7. REDUCING THE POWER OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS: Lisbon would reduce the power of National Parliaments to decide 49 policy areas or matters by shifting their powers to the EU, and increase the influence of the European Parliament in making EU laws in 19 new areas (See euabc.eu for the two lists).

8. A “SELF-AMENDING” TREATY: Lisbon could be regarded as a self-amending Treaty in that it would permit the EU Prime Ministers and Presidents to shift most remaining EU policy areas where unanimity is required and a national veto still exists – for example on tax harmonisation – to qualified majority voting on the EU Council of Ministers, without the need of further EU Treaties or referendums (Art.48 TEU).

Lisbon would also extend the so-called “Flexibility Clause”, which allows the EU to take action and adopt measures to attain one of the EU’s objectives even if “the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers‘”, to all areas of the Treaty and not just the internal market rules as at present (Art.352 TFEU). This would open the floodgates to more political integration, viz. centralisation, by means of this article, which is already widely used.

9. GIVING THE EU ITS OWN TAXES: Lisbon would permit the post-Lisbon EU to impose its own EU-wide taxes directly on us for the first time, on top of national taxes, in order to raise its “own resources” for the EU itself, without the need of further EU Treaties or referendums (Art.311 TFEU). This would have to be unanimously agreed by the Prime Ministers and Presidents, but seeing how they can agree unanimously to push through Lisbon, they should have no problem in agreeing EU taxes in due time to finance all the extra functions which the post-Lisbon Union would exercise.

10. A RACE TO THE BOTTOM IN PAY: Lisbon would copperfasten the Laval, Rüffert and related judgements of the EU Court of Justice, which put the competition rules of the EU market above the right of trade unions to enforce pay standards higher than the minimum for migrant workers. At the same time Lisbon would give the EU full control of immigration policy (Art.79 TFEU).

11. FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND HARMONISING TAXES: Lisbon would amend the existing treaties to give the EU exclusive power as regards rules on foreign direct investment(Arts.206-7 TFEU). It would give the EU Court of Justice the power to order the harmonisation of national indirect taxes if it judges that these cause a “distortion of competition” (Art.113 TFEU, Protocol 27 on the Internal Market and Competition). These steps could threaten Ireland’s 12.5% company profits tax, which is the principal incentive that attracts foreign companies to Ireland and keeps them here when they come.

12. A NON-ELECTED EU PRESIDENT: The Treaty would enable the 27 EU Prime Ministers to appoint an EU President for up to five years without allowing voters any say as to who he or she would be, thereby abolishing the present six-month rotating EU presidencies (Art.15 TEU).

13. NEUTRALITY AND A MORE MILITARIZED EU: Lisbon would militarize the EU further by requiring Member States “progressively to improve their military capabilities” (Art.42.3 TEU) and to aid and assist other Member States experiencing armed attack “by all the means in their power” (Art.42.7 TEU).

______

*TEC= European Community Treaty; TEU = Treaty on European Union as amended by the Lisbon Treaty; TFEU = Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as amended by the Lisbon Treaty. These two amended Treaties together would become the Constitution of the new post-Lisbon European Union.

_______

Issued by the National Platform EU Research and Information Centre, 24 Crawford Ave., Dublin 9; Tel.: 01-8305792; Director Anthony Coughlan. This document has been compiled with the aid of authorities on European and Irish constitutional law. See also the our web-site: nationalplatform.org
For more detailed information see euabc.eu This is a dictionary/lexicon on all matters to do with the EU and Lisbon, that is neutral as between the Yes and No sides. It has articles from both sides and seeks to give people the honest facts so that they can make up their own minds.

Filed under: Lisbon Treaty | Tagged: , , , , | Leave a comment »

⚠Irish Dáil should not have inferior powers to the German Parliament in controlling Irish Government Ministers when exercising the Lisbon Treaty’s self-amending powers

Posted on 2 Deireadh an tSamhraidh, 2009 by NationalPlatform.Org

The  Dáil and Seanad should insist on  parliamentary control over the Taoiseach and Government Ministers in exercising the self-amending powers of the Lisbon Treaty, just as the German Constitutional Court requires the German Parliament to do.

Ireland should not be content with a lesser standard of parliamentary control of  Government Ministers than Germany if the Lisbon Treaty should be ratified.

The Government should make provision for Oireachtas control of Lisbon’s self-amending powers  in legislation accompanying the Lisbon Treaty Referendum Bill.

Otherwise not only the people, but the Dail and Seanad,  would be agreeing to give extraordinary powers to Ministers if the Lisbon Treaty should come into force.

The Simplified Treaty Revision Procedure proposed by Lisbon (Art.48.7, amended Treaty on European Union) would permit the Prime Ministers and Presidents on the European Council to shift European Union decision-taking from unanimity to qualified majority voting in most of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union (TFEU), as long as they agreed this unanimously amongst themselves.

This could apply, for example, to the Treaty article dealing with harmonising indirect taxes (Art.113 TFEU), where unanimity is currently required

Lisbon also has   several “bridge articles” or “ratchet-clauses“, which would allow the European Council to switch from unanimity to majority voting in certain specified areas, such as judicial cooperation in civil matters (Art.81.3 TFEU), in criminal matters (Art.83.1 TFEU), in relation to the EU Public Prosecutor (Art.86.4 TFEU) and the Multiannual financial framework (Art.312.2 TFEU).

While the Lisbon Treaty provides that National Parliaments have to be notified of shifts from unanimity to qualified majority voting in some, though not all,  of these cases,  National Parliaments are not required to give their formal agreement.  The Taoiseach and Government Ministers would be able therefore to exercise these powers without  proper parliamentary control.

Of concern also is the enlarged scope of the “Flexibility Clause” (Art.352 TFEU), whereby if  the Treaty does not provide the necessary powers to enable the Union attain its very wide objectives, the Council of Ministers may take appropriate measures by unanimity.

The Lisbon Treaty would extend this provision from the area of operation of the Common Market, where it operates at present,  to all of the new Union’s policies directed at attaining its much wider post-Lisbon objectives. The Flexibility Clause has been widely used to extend EU law-making over the years. The consent of National Parliaments  is not required for Government Ministers to use it.

As the judgement of the  German Constitutional Court states (par. 414):  “To the extent that the general bridging procedure pursuant to Article 48.7(3)TEU Lisbon and the special bridging clause pursuant to Article 81.3(3) TFEU grant the national parliaments a right to make known their opposition, this is not a  sufficient equivalent to the requirement of ratification. It is therefore necessary that the representative of the German Government  in the European Council or in the Council may only approve the draft Resolution if empowered to do so by the German Bundestag and Bundesrat within a period yet to be determined …”

And again: ” …the silence of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat  may not be construed as approval.” (par. 416)

As things stand, Ireland’s Dail and Seanad will be expected to remain silent while Irish Government Ministers exercise these extraordinary new powers at EU level  in a post-Lisbon EU – unless legislation comparable to what Germany’s Constitutional Court proposes makes their actions subject to parliamentary approval in advance, and subject indirectly to the approval of Ireland’s citizens.

On Tuesday the German Constitutional Court ruled that ratification of the Lisbon Treaty would only be constitutional for Germany if parliamentary control  – and indirectly citizens’ control – over German Government Ministers operating at EU level were instituted in these “self-amending: Treaty areas.

This should also be done in Ireland.

(Signed)

Anthony Coughlan
Director

 

Filed under: Lisbon Treaty | Tagged: , , , , | Leave a comment »

☘Lisbon Treaty News: German Constitutional Court delays Germany’s ratification of the Lisbon Treaty

Posted on 30 Meán an tSamhraidh, 2009 by NationalPlatform.Org

Below for your information is a news item received from  Open Europe, London,  on the German Constitutional Court’s  decision of this morning on the Lisbon Treaty.

Appended to this post is an ☛on-site link to the Constitutional Court’s  decision  in English.

It seems that the  Constitutional  Court is saying that Germany, at least , must ensure that their parliament – both houses – participates in major EU decisions.

The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung  says the Constitutional Court ruling is demanding a law to guarantee the rights of the German Parliament in the EU decision-making process.

If that is so, should not Oireachtas Eireann have a law requiring this too – and Westminster and Paris and Prague and Bucharest, and 22 others?

Should  not all EU National  Parliaments also have  “participation in European lawmaking procedures”?

The most important  operative paragraphs of the  Court’s  ruling seem to be  these ones:-

The Basic Law does not grant the German state bodies powers to transfer sovereign powers in such a way that their exercise can independently establish other competences for the European Union. It prohibits the transfer of competence to decide on its own competence  (Kompetenz-Kompetenz).

The principle of conferral is therefore not only a principle of European law (Article 5.1 of the Treaty on European Union; Article 5.1 sentence 1 and 5.12 of the Treaty on European Union  in its version of the Treaty of Lisbon ), but, just like the European Union’s obligation to respect the Member States’ national identity (Article 6.3 TEU; Article 4.2 sentence 1 TEU Lisbon), it takes up constitutional principles from the Member States. The integration programme of the European Union must therefore be sufficiently precise.

To the extent that the Member States elaborate the law laid down in the Treaties in such a way that, with the principle of conferral fundamentally continuing to apply, an amendment of the law laid down in the Treaties can be brought about without a ratification procedure, a special responsibility is incumbent on the legislative bodies, apart from the Federal Government, as regards participation, which, in Germany, must, on the national level, comply with the requirements under Article 23.1 of the Basic Law (responsibility for integration).

The act approving a treaty amending a European Treaty and the national accompanying laws must therefore be such that European integration continues to take place according to the principle of conferral without the possibility for the European Union of taking possession of Kompetenz-Kompetenz or to violate the Member States’ constitutional identity which is not amenable to integration, in this case, that of the Basic Law.

For borderline cases of what is still constitutionally admissible, the German legislature must, if necessary, make arrangements with its laws that accompany approval to ensure that the responsibility for integration of the legislative bodies can sufficiently develop.

(Signed)
– Anthony Coughlan
Director

German Constitutional Court suspends ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, demanding a change to German law giving parliament more say over EU decision-making

CREDIT: Open Europe

30 June 2009

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung reports that the German Constitutional Court has ruled that the Lisbon Treaty is compatible with the German Constitution, but has withheld approval for immediate ratification, demanding a law to guarantee the rights of the German Parliament in the EU decision-making process.

The press release of the Constitutional Court notes that the German ratification act should be modified because the German Lower House and Upper House “have not been accorded sufficient rights of participation in European lawmaking procedures and treaty amendment procedures.”

It continues: “the Federal Republic of Germany’s instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon may not be deposited as long as the constitutionally required legal elaboration of the parliamentary rights of participation has not entered into force.”

The press release notes that: “the further development of the competences of the European Parliament can reduce, but not completely fill, the gap between the extent of the decision-making power of the Union’s institutions and the citizens’ democratic power of action in the Member States.”

FT Deutschland notes that “the Judges have considered the EU to have a democratic deficit. Therefore sovereign rights such as decisions on budgetary matters or on penal law, cannot be transferred to the EU without the consent of the German Lower and Upper House”. The newspaper reports that this means the German Parliament will in future need to consent to any changes to the EU treaties, with Frankfurter Rundschau reporting that military operations, “which could be possible after Lisbon”, will have to be approved by the German Parliament.

Deutsche Welle quotes the Court saying: “If one wanted to summarise this result, one could say: the Constitutional Court says ‘yes’ to the Lisbon Treaty but demands that parliament’s right to participation be strengthened at the national level.”

Die Welt notes that the German law giving the Parliament more say could pass soon, with a first reading to be held on 26 August. The leader of the Christian Democrat faction leader in the German Parliament Norbert Röttgen has announced that the second and third reading are planned for 8 September. German elections are to be held on 27 September.

Open Europe has published a new poll, conducted by German polling company Psyma, which shows that 77 percent of German voters want a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty.

☛ German Constitutional Court Decision: Lisbon Treaty Ratification

Filed under: Lisbon Treaty | Tagged: , , , , | Leave a comment »

☘Lisbon Treaty News: McCreevy proud – Europe would vote “No” / Guarantees Worthless / Big Brother EU / Hidden Tax Plan

Posted on 29 Meán an tSamhraidh, 2009 by NationalPlatform.Org

Filed under: EU Foreign Policy, Lisbon Treaty | Tagged: , , , , , , , | Leave a comment »

⚠ Lisbon “guarantees” on the right to life, family and education are about as useful as a gate in the middle of a field…

Posted on 19 Meán an tSamhraidh, 2009 by NationalPlatform.Org

…Some questions for Taoiseach Cowen and Minister Martin to answer:

Why have Taoiseach Brian Cowen and Foreign Minister Micheál narrowed the scope of the Lisbon “guarantee” on protecting the right to life, family and education in the Irish Constitution to one small area of the Lisbon Treaty?

The wording below of the proposed Lisbon “guarantee” in Section A of today’s European Council decision or agreement, even if it were given binding European Treaty status by opening and adding a Protocol to the Lisbon Treaty, which is not intended – is about as useful as a gate in the middle of a field!

It purports to restrict the effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the Irish Constitution in ONLY ONE SMALL AREA – “the area of Freedom, Security and Justice“, which is only one of 13 areas of shared competences in the EU, i.e. shared between the Union and its Member States.

The guarantee does not purport to protect the Irish constitutional position in the other areas of the Treaty. Why not?

See Article 4 (TFEU) below, which sets out the 13 areas of shared powers or competences. The so-called “guarantee” purporting to restrict the effects of Lisbon on the Irish Constitution does not affect the other 12 policy areas in Article 4, for example in relation to the internal market, or social policy.

Nor – importantly – does it affect areas which are the exclusive competence of the EU in Articles 3 & 6 TFEU and elsewhere. It therefore does not apply, for instance, in relation to laying down competition rules necessary for the functioning of the EU internal market, or the common commercial policy, which are exclusive EU competences or powers.

Why is this particular guarantee limited in this way?

The second Summit meeting “guarantee” relating to Taxation, says simply “Nothing in the Treaty of Lisbon makes any change of any kind for any Member State to the extent or operation of the competence of the European Union in relation to taxation.”

The 1993 Maastricht Treaty Protocol purporting to protect the Irish constitutional position on abortion, likewise, covers the WHOLE TREATY and all of its amendments. It says: “Nothing in the Treaties… shall affect the application in Ireland of Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution of Ireland”

Who are Taoiseach Cowen and Foreign Minister Cowen trying to fool? They have some questions to answer.

(Signed)
Anthony Coughlan
(Director)

Excerpt from the Decision/Agreement of the European Council

Section A

Right to Life, Family and Education

Nothing in the Treaty of Lisbon (a) attributing legal status to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, or (b) in the provisions of that Treaty in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice affects in any way the scope and applicability of the protection of the right to life in Article 40.3.1. 40.3.2 and 40.3.3, the protection of the family in Article 41 and the protection of the rights in respect of education in Articles 42 and 44.2.4 and 44.2.5 provided by the Constitution of Ireland.

ARTICLE 4 (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union -TFEU), as amended by the Lisbon Treaty

1. The Union shall share competence with the Member States where the Treaties confer on it a competence which does not relate to the areas referred to in Articles 3 and 6.

2. Shared competence between the Union and the Member States applies in the following principal areas:
(a) internal market;
(b) social policy, for the aspects defined in this Treaty;
(c) economic, social and territorial cohesion;
(d) agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine biological resources;
(e) environment;
(f) consumer protection;
(g) transport;
(h) trans-European networks;
(i) energy;
(j) area of freedom, security and justice; (emphasis added)
(k) common safety concerns in public health matters, for the aspects defined in this Treaty.

3. In the areas of research, technological development and space, the Union shall have competence to carry out activities, in particular to define and implement programmes; however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs.

4. In the areas of development cooperation and humanitarian aid, the Union shall have competence to carry out activities and conduct a common policy; however, the exercise of that competence shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs.

Filed under: Lisbon Treaty | Tagged: , , , , , | Leave a comment »

⚠ Spoofing the Irish media and public with Lisbon “guarantees” that guarantee nothing

Posted on 19 Meán an tSamhraidh, 2009 by NationalPlatform.Org

The central point to grasp about the current EU Summit proceedings on the Lisbon Treaty is that Messrs Brian Cowen’s and Micheál Martin’s “legally binding guarantees” to meet Irish voters’ concerns do not change a jot or tittle of that Treaty.

If they changed even a comma, the Lisbon Treaty would become a different Treaty and would have to be ratified again from scratch by the National Parliaments of the 27 EU Member States.

EU politicians cannot change the treaties, or their effects, just by signing a new agreement: the Court of Justice will always say that the provisions of a fully ratified European Treaty trump any attempt to modify the operation of the Treaty through an unratified agreement.

EU treaties cannot be amended in any way unless the document embodying the amendments has been both signed by EU leaders, and then ratified by all EU Member States “in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements”. That is not happening here.

Thus the Lisbon Treaty which the Irish people will be voting on in the autumn will be exactly the same Treaty as the one which the majority of voters rejected in last year’s referendum by 53% to 47% on a 53% turnout.

If the Lisbon Treaty comes into force, it would be the EU Court of Justice which would interpret it, as the EU Court is the only body authorised under the European Treaties to interpret them and decide how they should be applied.

The “decision” or agreement of the European Council that certain provisions of the Lisbon Treaty mean such and such is just that – an agreement between the 27 Prime Ministers and Presidents. It is legally binding on them as individuals, but it is not an international Treaty between States which would require ratification by the 27 EU States putting it before their National Parliaments for approval, as is the normal mode of ratification of treaties.

The text of the introduction to the Summit “decision” states that it is made by the Heads of State or Government “desiring to address those (Irish) concerns in conformity with that Treaty”, viz the Lisbon Treaty.

Being in conformity with the Lisbon Treaty, the “decision” or agreement cannot add to or substract from Lisbon in the slightest, and it would be for the EU Court, and the Court alone, to decide what Lisbon and its manifold provisions would mean if Lisbon should come into force.

So far as one can ascertain, the Summit “decision” or “agreement” is not actually being signed by the 27 Prime Ministers and Presidents who agree it, as would be normal with an international Treaty pending its formal ratification. Note that it is not being called a Treaty, but rather a “decision” or “agreement”.

Formally registering this decision at the United Nations as a political agreement between the Prime Ministers and Presidents concerned, is intended to make it look more significant to the Irish public. This would confer on it a minor status in international law, but not in EU law. It would not and could not override EU law.

Some future meeting of the European Council of EU Prime Ministers and Presidents could make some other decision or agreement, possibly even in contradiction to this agreement, and that would be equally valuable or valueless, for it would not add to or take away from the Treaties one iota.

The whole process is meant to give the Irish media and public the impression that some real change is being made to the Lisbon Treaty, when nothing like that is happening.

Nor is the Summit “decision” or “agreement” a legally binding Protocol attached to Lisbon, which would form part of that Treaty and which would be binding in European law and on the EU Court of Justice in interpreting and applying European law. For that would require opening the Lisbon Treaty and ratifiying the new Protocol anew as part of it.

Promise of a special Irish Protocol or “clarificatory declaration” to be attached to some future EU Treaty, possibly years away, would be just that – a promise. It would not affect the Lisbon Treaty coming into force, with all its legal obligations. It would not prevent the constitutionally new European Union which Lisbon would create being established.

In no way could a promised Protocol to some future EU Treaty resile or pull back from the obligations entailed by the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty once Lisbon had come into force.

What could such a promised future Protocol do in any case, for Ireland is not seeking any opt-outs from the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty?

In 1992 when the Danish people voted No to the Maastricht Treaty, its Government sought and secured legally binding opt-outs from the central provisions of Maastricht – the euro-currency, EU military and security commitments, and Maastricht’s provisions on EU citizenship. These provisions of Maastricht were never applied to Denmark and that position was formally recognised by a Protocol in the EU Treaties at the time of the 1998 Amsterdam Treaty, and these Danish opt-outs still apply.

Nothing like that is being sought by Ireland, whose Government has signed up to and accepted the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty and the EU Constitution which it embodies in their entirety.

That is just as true now as it was last year.

(Signed)

Anthony Coughlan
(Contact for further information: 01-8305792 )

Filed under: Lisbon Treaty, Myths & Misrepresentations | Tagged: , , , | Leave a comment »

☟Non-Irish Bodies

Posted on 11 Meán an tSamhraidh, 2009 by NationalPlatform.Org

Filed under: Lisbon Treaty | Tagged: , | Leave a comment »

☟Irish Organisations

Posted on 11 Meán an tSamhraidh, 2009 by NationalPlatform.Org

Filed under: Lisbon Treaty | Tagged: | Leave a comment »

⁂ The EU, the US founding fathers and the “last word”

Posted on 21 Aibreán, 2009 by NationalPlatform.Org

☞ ft.com/brusselsblog
by Denis Cooper

There can be few more terrifying sentences in contemporary English than: “The Treaty of Lisbon is not the last word.”

The sentence appears in “Saving the European Union” a new book by Andrew Duff, a British Liberal Democrat who sits in the European Parliament. It is certain to raise the hackles of anti-Lisbon campaigners, who have said all along that the EU can never resist the temptation to keep tinkering with its institutional arrangements, no matter how strong the evidence that European voters are thoroughly turned off by the whole process.

Before I develop this point, let me note that Duff’s short book is an excellent introduction to the Lisbon Treaty and to the challenges facing today’s EU. Friends and foes alike of the EU will benefit from reading it. Duff is one of the European Parliament’s top constitutional affairs experts, and he writes clean, crisp prose.

The Lisbon Treaty’s fate hangs mainly on the outcome of a referendum, expected to take place in October, in Ireland, whose electorate rejected the document in June 2008 by a 53.4 to 46.6 per cent margin.

If the Irish reverse their verdict and Lisbon comes into effect, EU leaders have solemnly promised us that there will be no more institutional tinkering, no more inter-governmental conferences, no more constitutional conventions – in short, no more attempts to ape Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and the other US founding fathers – for a long time to come. “We’re in tune with the voters,” is the message. “We know they wouldn’t forgive us.”

The institutional reform efforts that are encapsulated in Lisbon began as long ago as 2001 and have been plagued with embarrassing setbacks, so it is understandable that most EU leaders have little appetite at the moment for yet more self-punishment. Still, I have always had a sneaking suspicion that the adoption of Lisbon would in fact serve as a prelude to another bite at the institutional cherry.
Duff’s book strengthens this suspicion. “The founding fathers of the United States admitted from the outset that the Constitution as drafted was not the final word. Far from over-selling the text as the ultimate settlement, as some Europeans have done with Lisbon, the Americans were bold enough to admit that further amendment would be both desirable and necessary.”

Duff continues: “So the Treaty of Lisbon is not the last word. Europe can decide whether it wants to be more united or more divided: it neither can nor will stay as it is. The challenge is to manage this federalisation process with similar skill and boldness to that evinced in their time by Messrs Madison, Hamilton and Jefferson.”

Well, there you have it. Lisbon isn’t the last word. Europe must move on with its “federalisation process”. You can’t say you haven’t been warned.

Filed under: Lisbon Treaty | Tagged: , | Leave a comment »

« An Leathnach Roimhe Seo — An Chéad Leathanach Eile »