Irish Times: “Lisbon would turn Ireland into a province”

Irish Times  article, Friday 16 May
 
VOTE NO TO LISBON AND REJECT EUROPEAN FEDERAL STATE

Lisbon would  turn Ireland into a province or region of an EU superstate and make us citizens of it first rather than of the Irish Republic
 
by Anthony Coughlan
 
The push to turn the European Union into a superpower with many of the features of a Federal State goes back to World War 2, when the continental imperial powers, France, Germany, Italy, Holland and Belgium, experienced the trauma of defeat and occupation.  After 1945 they found themselves much diminished in a world dominated by the USA and USSR.
One response of their political elites was to decide that if they could no longer be Big Powers individually on their own, they would seek to be a Big Power collectively. This is not the full story of European integration, but it is perhaps the most important part of the story. 

The Lisbon Treaty is the constitutional culmination of the federalist project which has been the political dynamic of European integration ever since the Schumann Declaration of 1950 proclaimed the European Coal and Steel Community to be “the first step in the federation of Europe”.

The EU commemorates that Declaration on  9 May each year – Europe Day.  Fifty years later, in 2004, Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt proclaimed the EU Constitution to be “the capstone of a European Federal State”.
When the French and Dutch rejected the EU Constitution in their 2005 referendums, the Prime Ministers and Presidents decided to give the EU the constitutional form of a Federation indirectly rather than directly.

This the Lisbon Treaty does by amending the two existing European Treaties instead of replacing them entirely  by a formally titled Constitution. But the legal-political effect is the same.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WE WILL VOTE ON 

The first sentence of the Amendment which the Government is asking  to insert into the Irish  Constitution provides that the State may ratify the Treaty of Lisbon and “may be a member of the European Union established by virtue of that  [Lisbon] Treaty.”  

This sentence shows that the European Union which would be established by the Lisbon Treaty, although having the same name, is constitutionally and politically a different Union from that which we are currently members of, which was established by the 1993 Maastricht Treaty.

The second sentence of the Constitutional Amendment would then give the constitution of this post-Lisbon Union supremacy over the Irish Constitution:


“No provision of this  [Irish] Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State that are necessitated by membership of the European Union referred to Š or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the said European Union or by institutions thereof, or by bodies competent under the treaties referred to in this section, from having the force of law in the State.”
This post-Lisbon EU would have the constitutional form of a supranational European Federation – in effect a State – in which Ireland and the other Member States would have the constitutional status of provincial or regional states.

From the inside the Union would look like something based on Treaties between States. From the outside it would look  like a State itself.  This constitutional revolution in both the Union ands its Member States would be brought about by four legal steps which are set out in the Treaty, as they were in the previous EU Constitution:

Firstly, Lisbon would give the post-Lisbon Union full legal personality separate from and superior to its Member States, so that it could act as a State in the international community of States, sign Treaties with other States in all areas of its powers, have its own political President, Foreign Minister(High Representative), diplomatic service, embassies and Public Prosecutor, and make most of our laws.

Secondly, Lisbon would abolish the European Community which we joined in 1973 and which still exists as part of the present EU, and replace it by the new Union (Art.1 TEU). 


Thirdly, it would give the new Union a unified constitutional stucture so that all areas of government would come within its aegis either actually or potentially(Art.4 TEU, Arts.1-6 TFEU).  The only major feature of a fully developed Federation which the EU would then lack would be the power to force its Member States to go to war against their will.

SUBORDINATING THE IRISH CONSTITUTION TO THE EU CONSTITUTION   

Finally, Lisbon would make us all real citizens for the first time of this post-Lisbon Union, rather than our being notional or honorary EU “citizens” as at present(Art.9 TEU).

One can only be a citizen of a State and all States must have citizens. As real EU citizens we would owe it the duty of obedience to its laws and loyalty to its authority over and above our obedience and loyalty to Ireland and the Irish Constitution and laws.
We would still retain our national Irish citizenship, but our new dual citizenship post-Lisbon would not be citizenship of two different States, but rather of the federal and regional/provincial levels of one state, as is normal in such classical Federations as the USA, Federal Germany, Switzerland and Canada. 

The Irish Constitution would remain – just as the various states of the Federal USA still retain their constitutions –  but it would be subordinate to the EU Constitution in any case of conflict between the two. 

One indicator of the constitutional change which Lisbon would bring about is that Members of the European Parliament, who under the present Treaties are “representatives of the peoples  of the Member States brought together in the Community”, would become “representatives ofthe Union’s citizens in the post-Lisbon EU(Art.14.2 TEU).  

Another is that the European Council, the summit meetings of Prime Ministers and Presidents, would become an EU institution for the first time, legally bound to forward the interests of the Union, not of the national Governments or electorates concerned, so that its acts or its failing to act would be subject to judicial review by the EU Court of Justice(Art.13 TEU).

Couple these constitutional changes with the power-political changes which Lisbon would bring about and it is clear that the Lisbon referendum confronts the Irish people with a momentous choice.

The most important power-political change is that Lisbon would base law-making in the post-Lisbon Union primarily on population size.

 This would double Germany’s relative voting strength on the Council of Ministers from its present 8% to 17%. It would increase the voting weight of France, Britain and Italy from their present 8% to 12% each and it would halve Ireland’s weight from 2% to 0.8%.(Art.16.4 TEU)
As well as our being deprived of a voice on the EU Commission, the body which proposes all EU laws, for five years out of every 15, a little noticed feature of Lisbon’s provisions is that when it comes to our turn to have an Irish Commissioner, we would  lose the right to decide who he or she would be. Henceforth Ireland would be able to make “suggestions” only, for the new Commission President to decide(Art.17.7 TEU). 
It is surely a major historical moment by any standard: this attempt to turn four million Irish people and nearly 500 million Europeans into real citizens of a real EU Federation, without most of them being aware of it, and without any but us Irish being allowed to have a direct say on it.  

If Lisbon is ratified it is bound to lead to major democratic reactions across Europe when people discover that their national independence and democracy have been filched from them. That is why the best course for the Irish people is to vote No to Lisbon on 12 June, as the French and Dutch did to its virtually identical predecessor, for their own sakes and for Europe’s.
_______
Anthony Coughlan is secretary of the National Platform EU  Research and Information Centre, 24 Crawford Avenue, Dublin  9;  Tel.: 00-353-1-8305792;   Web-site: nationalplatform.org

Barroso, Bonde and Ireland’s company Taxes

Monday 28 April 2008


Barroso, Bonde and  Ireland’s company Taxes . . . Excerpt from “Bonde’s Briefing” by Jens-Peter Bonde MEP, Chairman, Independence and Democracy Group in the European Parliament, forwarded for your information

Misinformation in Ireland

I was in Ireland this weekend (18 April). Accidentally I met the Commission President José Manuel Barroso at the University of Cork. I had two other meetings. He made a splendid speech, particularly when he went outside his manuscript.

It became clear to me that his civil servants had agreed a part of his speech with the Irish Government representatives to mislead Irish citizens about a hot issue in the Irish debate: their low corporate tax at only 12.5 %.

Mislead is a strong – but very precise – expression. Barroso said there was nothing new in the Lisabon Treaty about taxes.

This is positively wrong. The new Art.113 TFEU(Treaty on the Functioning of the EU)  about taxes adds a new phrase of “and to avoid distortion of competition” as an amendment to the Article.  This is a clear invitation to the European Court of Justice to outlaw the very distorting low Irish rate.

Today the EU is only competent to harmonise tax laws under Article 113 if it is “necessary to ensure the establishment of the internal market”.  With this Lisbon Treaty amendment the EU can also harmonise  tax laws if competition is distorted – this is a much wider concept. When is competition not distorted by differences?

In a new special Protocol to the Lisbon Treaty, “Protocol on the Internal Market and Competition” (No. 4),  it is also added that the Internal Market “includes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted”. National hindrances can be outlawed, even by legislation based on the so-called “Flexibility clause” referred to in this Protocol.

In Art.116 TFEU distortions of competition can be hindered by laws decided by qualified majority voting in the Council. First, the Commission consults the distorting Member State.  Article 116 then provides: “If such consultation does not result in an agreement eliminating the distortion in question, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall issue the necessary directives. Any  other appropriate measures provided for in the Treaties may be adopted.”

In the Reader-Friendly Edition of the Consolidated Treaties which I have edited (see euabc.com )  the text in bold is the new addition to Article 113 on  corporation taxes made by the Lisbon Treaty: “and to avoid distortion of competition”. Hindrances  may be eliminated by majority voting.

So, if I was Irish and interested in the low corporate tax – which I am not – I would propose a strong Protocol to protect the low rate. It is not difficult to foresee an attack from another country – or company. The French Presidency has already signalled its plans for taxation before they enter into office 1 July.

The Irish Government has criticized the French intentions. Well, the  tax issue is also included in the annual work program for Barroso’s European Commission for 2008!


“Work will also be continued in order to allow companies to choose an EU-wide tax base as set out in the 2008 Annual Policy Strategy. An impact assessment has been launched to examine the options and their implications”, it is said at page 7 of the Work Programme.

The Commission will only publish their proposal – after the Irish referendum. All controversial proposals are delayed before referendums. This is normal practice for the Commission. It is only un-normal that the method has been leaked to the press with the publication of a private e-mail from a British diplomat referring  to information received from the Irish Government in confidence.

The Commission is working on a proposal to harmonise – maybe not the rate, but the base for calculating corporate taxes. The economic effect for Ireland may be the same.

Ireland has earned a lot on multinational companies settling in Ireland but selling products to the whole of the EU. Now, the Commission proposal – according to rumours – will distribute profit for taxation according to the spread of the turnover.

It does not sound surprising – or unjust – to me. This is the way the Commission is thinking – in spite of the Barroso speech to calm the Irish voters before their referendum scheduled for 12 June.

A joint rate will require unanimity, yes. But to outlaw the low rate in a Court verdict only requires a simple majority in the EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg. It is mis-leading not to tell the Irish the full truth about the Lisbon Treaty and taxation.

Even new direct taxes for the Union could be introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.  See Art. 311 TFEU on the establishment of new Union “own resources” by unanimity among Member States.

“…it may establish new categories of own resources”, it is said in the new Art. 311 inserted by Lisbon.

It is also said stated: “The Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies”.
< http://www.bonde.com/index.php/bonde_UK/article/bondes_briefing_23042008 >

A Note on Jens-Peter Bonde MEP

The author of the above statement, Jens-Peter Bonde, Danish MEP, has just edited  a “Reader-Friendly Edition of the Consolidated Treaties as Amended by the Treaty  of Lisbon“. This shows the additions to the two main EU Treaties that would  be made by Lisbon in bold type,  and the deletions in strikethrough.

This volume contains an invaluable index which will enable anyone interested in a particular topic to find easily the Consolidated Treaty Articles relating to it and to see how these would be affected by any deletions or additions made by the Lisbon Treaty.

This Reader-Friendly Edition of the Lisbon Treaty is now  downloadable free from  bonde.com.

Bonde has also written a short 100-page book describing the background to the Treaty  and giving a general analysis of it: “From EU Constitution to Lisbon Treaty”. This will be downloadable later this week from  the web-sites:  bonde.com and euinfo.ie

Jens-Peter Bonde was a member of the Convention on the Future of Europe which drew up the original  EU Constitution that  would now be brought into being indirectly rather than directly  by means of  the Lisbon Treaty.  He has been an MEP since the first direct elections to the European Parliament  in 1979 and  he is retiring  from the Parliament on 9 May, Europe Day, having recently reached his 60th birthday. He first came to Ireland in 1986 to express support for  the late Raymond Crotty in his constitutional action on the Single European Act, which led to the current referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. He is chairman of the Independence and Democracy Group in the European Parliament to which Munster MEP Kathy Sinnott  belongs.  He has written some 40 books on EU-related topics over the years and  is widely known and respected for his tireless work over decades for a more transparent, less centralised and  more democratic European Union.  Together with Ireland’s John Gormley and others he produced a minority report on an Alternative to the EU Constitution at the close of Giscard d’Estaing’s Convention on the Future of Europe in 2004.
For enquiries contact Anthony Coughlan at 01-8305792.

Jens-Peter Bonde himself may be contacted  at the European Parliament at 00-32-2-2845167 and at Jens-Peter.bonde@europarl.europa.eu


Irish Referendum, Treaty of Lisbon: Some Myths

SOME MYTHS ABOUT THE LISBON TREATY

Myth 1. LISBON WILL MAKE THE EU MORE EFFICIENT:
If you get rid of democracy and the need to consult with people, you can certainly get more laws passed. But will they be good laws? Is that more efficient government? When it comes to law-making it is quality that counts, not quantity. Hitler could issue new laws ever five minutes, but were they good laws?

The advent of 12 new Member States has not made the negotiation of new EU laws more difficult since they joined the EU. On the contrary, a study by the Science-Politique University in Paris calculated that new rules have been adopted a quarter times more quickly since the enlargement from 15 to 27 Member States in 2004 as compared with the two years before enlargement. The study also showed that the 15 older Member States block proposed EU laws twice as often as the newcomers. Professor Helen Wallace of the London School of Economics has found that the EU institutions are working as well as they ever did despite the enlargement of the EU from 15 to 27 members. She found that “the evidence of practice since May 2004 suggests that the EU’s institutional processes and practice have stood up rather robustly to the impact of enlargement.” The Nice Treaty voting arrangements thus seem to be working well.

Myth 2. LISBON ENABLES THE EU TO DEAL WITH CLIMATE CHANGE:
Lisbon would commit the EU to “promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems and in particular combating climate change”(Art. 191.1 TFEU). This is laudable, but its significance has been “spun” out of all proportion. Note that the action is “at international level”. It does not give the EU new powers internally. Any internal actions on environmental problems would have to be reconciled with the EU’s rules on distorting competition, safeguarding the internal market and sustaining the energy market. Combatting climate change can carry heavy costs. EU targets for carbon dioxide reduction in Ireland announced earlier this year would cost Ireland €1000 million a year if implemented, which would average some €500 per household. In fact the EU’s carbon reduction targets would impose a heavier relative burden on Ireland than on any other EU country. Also note the absurdity that the new Treaty reference is to combatting climate-change, without qualification. It is not just “man-made” climate change. So the EU is going to take on things affecting climate-change which are not of human origin, like sunspot cycle as well!

Myth 3: LISBON MAKES THE EU MORE DEMOCRATIC:
Lisbon provides that if one-third of National Parliaments object to the Commission’s proposal for an EU law, the Commission must reconsider it, but not necessarily abandon it (Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, Art.7.2). It might review the draft law, or if it considered the objection was not justified, it might ignore it. This right to complain, for that is what it is, is not an increase in the powers of National Parliaments, as it has been widely misrepresented as being, but is symbolic rather of their loss of real power. To say that it is an increase in the power of National Parliaments to “control”, or even to affect, EU legislation is a blatant lie. Lisbon takes away major law-making powers from National Parliaments. It would give power to the EU to legislate in relation to some 32 new policy areas, thereby removing these areas from decision by National Parliaments. It also gives the EU the power to decide many other matters.

Lisbon would increase the power of the European Parliament by giving it many new areas of new EU law which it could propose amendments to, but that does not compensate National Parliaments and the citizens who elect National Parliaments, for their loss of power to decide. The new EU laws would still be PROPOSED exclusively by the non-elected Commission and would then be MADE primarily by the Council of Ministers, mainly on the basis of population-based voting. The EU Parliament can only amend these EU laws if the Commission and Council agree. Ireland would have 12 members out of 750 in the European Parliament under Lisbon,a reductuon from the current 13. When we had 100 out of 600 MPs in the 19th century UK Parliament, the Irish people were not that happy with the laws that were passed there. Yet Westminster was a real Parliament which decided all UK laws. The Irish representatives could propose laws in it, as they cannot do in the European Parliament.

If someone says that it is the National Government which really decides what laws are passed in the Dail or Parliament, because the majority of TDs or MPs belong to the Government party, and the EU Commission is acting like a national government in proposing EU laws, the obvious reply is that National Governments are elected by National Parliaments, who in turn are elected by the national citizens. But the EU “Government”, the Commission, is not elected. It is appointed by the Commission President and the EU Prime Ministers and Presidents on the basis of qualified majority voting.

Treaty of Lisbon Irish Referendum: What we are voting on

THE KEY SENTENCES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

Below are the two key sentences of the amendment which you will be asked to put into the Irish Constitution on Thursday 12 June. If people vote Yes they will be turning the European Union which we are members of at present, and in which we will remain, into a Federal EU State in which Ireland would become a provincial state or region. This would be the end of Ireland’s position as an independent sovereign country. The French and Dutch have already rejected this proposal in referendums. By voting No we remain full EU Members based on the Nice Treaty, but we reject the Lisbon Treaty as a step too far. Millions of Europeans who are being denied referendums on Lisbon by their politicians, are hoping we will say No to it for their sakes.

“… The State may ratify the Treaty of Lisbon signed at Lisbon on the 13th day of December 2007, and may be a member of the European Union established by virtue of that Treaty. No provision of this [Irish] Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State that are necessitated by membership of the European Union, or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the said European Union or by institutions thereof, or by bodies competent under the treaties referred to in this section, from having the force of law in the State…” (emphasis added)
– 28th Amendment of the Constitution Bill, 2008 … What the people will be voting on in June

Lisbon Treaty Irish Referendum: Constitutional Implications [updated, August ’08]

The Constitutional Implications of the Treaty of Lisbon

– Giving the EU the constitutional form of a Federal State

Introduction: The peoples of Europe do not want to be turned into citizens of an EU Federation run on most undemocratic lines that would be under the effective control of the political elites of France and Germany.  They want their countries to remain independent democracies whose laws are made by people directly elected by the voters. By rejecting the Lisbon Treaty Ireland is saving both  itself and the EU from  a thoroughly bad Treaty which people in the other EU countries would  reject too if they got the chance to vote on it. This paper explains how the Lisbon Treaty, like the EU Constitution before it, would turn the Nation States of Europe into provinces of an undemocratically-run EU Federation and turn the peoples of Europe into real citizens of an EU State.

*   *   *

“The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations  for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe.” (emphasis added)
Schumann Declaration on the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community, 9 May 1950

“The Constitution is the capstone of a European Federal State.”
– Guy Verhofstadt, Belgian Prime Minister, Financial Times, 21 June 2004

“From the inside it looks like an arrangement based on Treaties between States. From the outside it looks like a State itself.”
–  Jens-Peter Bonde, From EU Constitution to Lisbon Treaty …  euinfo.ie and euabc.com

“The State may ratify the Treaty of Lisbon signed at Lisbon on the 13th day of December 2007, and  may be a member of the European Union established by virtue of that Treaty.    No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State that are necessitated by membership of the European Union, or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by  the said European Union or by institutions thereof, or by bodies competent under the treaties referred  to in this section, from having the force of law in the State.” (emphasis added)
–  Ireland’s 28th Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2008 …The first two sentences of the proposed  constitutional amendment which Irish voters rejected on 12 June 2008

*   *   *

1.  The Treaty of Lisbon is quite different from previous European Treaties, for it would give the EU its own State Constitution. If ratified it would establish a legally new European Union in the constitutional form of a supranational Federation.  It would thereby revolutionise the constitutional and political order of the EU itself and of its Member States.

Implicit in the first sentence quoted above from the Irish Government’s 28th Amendment of the Constitution Bill, which Irish voters rejected on 12  June 2008, is the fact that the Lisbon Treaty would establish a constitutionally  new European Union which legally and politically would be very different from what we know as the “European Union” today. The proposed constitutional amendment would have permitted Ireland to become a member of “the European Union established by virtue of that Treaty”, namely the Treaty of Lisbon. This  implicitly indicated  that the post-Lisbon Union would be a different EU from that which stems from the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union, which is the EU that we are members of at present.

The “European Union established by virtue of that Treaty”, which a majority of Irish voters rejected in their June 2008 referendum,  corresponds to the Union that was referred to in the first sentence of Article I-1 of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, which the voters of France and Holland rejected in their 2005 referendums.  This sentence stated: “This Constitution establishes the European Union.”  That sentence in turn corresponded to the following sentences  in Article 1 of the amended Treaty on European Union which would be inserted  by the Treaty of Lisbon if that treaty should be ratified:  “By this treaty the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European Union, hereinafter called ‘the Union’ on which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives they  have in common … The Union shall be founded on the present Treaty and on the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Treaties’). Those two Treaties shall have the same legal value. The Union shall replace and succeed the European Community.

Both the 2004 EU Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon which succeeded it would give the constitutional form of a supranational Federation to the new European Union which they each aimed to establish.  Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty would therefore usher in a constitutional and political revolution in what we call the European Union today and in the national constitutional order of the EU’s Member States.  Most people are unaware of this, for the whole process has been shrouded in deception.  Explaining the constitutional and political difference between the post-Lisbon Union and the pre-Lisbon Union is made difficult by the fact that the same name, “The European Union”, is being used for two entities, the pre-Lisbon EU and the post-Lisbon EU, which are constitutionally and politically profoundly different from one another.

The Lisbon Treaty would bring about this constitutional revolution by amending fundamentally the two existing European Treaties, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC). The former would retain its name, while the latter would be renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  These two amended Treaties would then become the de facto Constitution of the post-Lisbon European Union which they would constitute or establish, although they would not be called a Constitution.  The EU would thus be given a Constitution indirectly rather than directly, as had been proposed in the original Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. The 1993 Maastricht Treaty was a Treaty ON European Union, not “Of ” Union, for it did not establish an entity with legal personality which could be called the EU.  The Consolidated Treaties as amended by Lisbon would effectively become the “Treaty OF European Union”, for they would do that.

The provision of the Lisbon Treaty that “The Union shall replace and succeed the European Community” (Art.1, amended TEU) makes clear that the post-Lisbon Union would be quite a new entity, as the European Community which Ireland joined in 1973 and of which the 27 countries are all currently members,  would cease to exist.

Member States would still retain their national Constitutions post-Lisbon, but they would be subordinate to the new Union Constitution, as the second of the two sentences quoted above from the 28th Amendment  of the Constitution Bill makes clear.  As such the Irish and other Member State Constitutions would no longer be constitutions of sovereign States, just as the various local states of the USA retain their constitutions although they are subordinate to the Federal USA Constitution.

The new European Union’s powers would be conferred on it by its 27 Member States, for the latter would voluntarily have agreed to obey the EU’s superior authority in the policy areas surrendered, which nowadays cover much the greater part of government. Where else after all could the new Union obtain its powers?   This so-called “principle of conferral” is normal in all classical “bottom-up” Federations, such as the USA, 19th Century Germany, Switzerland, Canada and Australia, where originally sovereign States agree to surrender sovereignty to a higher federal authority.  These contrast with Federations which have been established by unitary States assuming federal form, for example  post-World War 2 Germany, Russia, India, Nigeria etc., which might be regarded as “top-down” Federations.

The Lisbon Treaty provision permitting a Member State to leave the EU (Art.50, amended TEU) also occurs in some Federal constitutions. There was such a provision in the early constitution of the USSR for example.  The remaining governmental powers, which have mainly to do with the traditional social services and the taxation needed to finance them, would remain with the Member States post-Lisbon. State sovereignty in the new post-Lisbon Union would be divided between the Federal and local state levels, as is normal in classical Federations.

The metamorphosis of the pre-Lisbon EU into a post-Lisbon Union with the same name but of fundamentally different constitutional and political character, is underpinned by changes in the formal structure of the amended Treaties which would become the new Union’s Constitution. The two treaties, the TEU and TFEU, are stated to have the same legal value (Art.1, amended TEU).  Up to now, Article 47 TEU has determined that the Treaty on European Union is subsidiary to the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), which Lisbon would rename The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  Post-Lisbon, this Article 47 TEU would be replaced by Article 40, amended TEU, which stipulates the subsidiarity of the Common Foreign and Security Policy(CFSP)  only, as against the other competences set out in the treaties. Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty would insert the new Title III on the institutions of the new Union into the Treaty on European Union, the primary treaty, and remove them from the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union, the present TEC, where they are currently set out.

2.  The Treaty would empower the post-Lisbon European Union to act as a State vis-a-vis other States

To understand the change that would be introduced by the Lisbon Treaty one needs to appreciate that what we call the European Union today is not a State. It is not even a distinct legal or corporate entity in its own right, for it does not have legal personality, although some legal writers contend that it has a form of  embryonic personality. Certain it is that the name “European Union” at present is the descriptive legal term for the totality of relations between its 27 Member States and their peoples. Article 1 of the current Treaty on European Union, deriving from the 1992 Maastricht Treaty which established the present EU, makes this quite clear when it states that “the Union shall be founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established by this Treaty. Its task shall be to organize, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the Member States and between their peoples.”

These relations appertain both to the “European Community” area, where supranational European law is operative, and the “intergovernmental” areas of foreign and security policy on the one hand and justice and home affairs on the other, where Member States cooperate freely with one another on the basis of retaining  their  State sovereignty and where European laws do not apply. These different areas, or “pillars” in EU terminology, together constitute what we call the European Union today.

The Lisbon Treaty would change this situation fundamentally by creating a constitutionally and politically new EU, while retaining the same name, the “European Union”.   Unlike the present European Union, this constitutionally new EU would be separate from and superior to its Member States, just as the USA is separate from and superior to Massachussetts or Kansas, or as Federal Germany is to Bavaria or Bremen.

This post-Lisbon Union would sign treaties with other States in all areas of its powers and conduct itself as a State in the international community of States. It would speak at the United Nations on agreed foreign policy positions, just as in the days of the Soviet Union the USSR had a UN seat while some of its component states, Ukraine and Byelorussia for example,  had UN seats too. Member States would be obliged to support the Union’s foreign and security policy “actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity”(Art.24.3, amended TEU) (emphasis added). The word “loyalty” makes clear the constitutional relation involved.

The Lisbon Treaty would also give the EU a political President, a Foreign Minister – to be called the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy –  a diplomatic corps, to be called the External Action Service,  and a Public Prosecutor.  The new EU would accede to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as most European States inside and outside the EU have already done.

The principle of the primacy and superiority of European law over the law of its  Member States  has not been stated in a European Treaty before.  Whereas Article I-6 of the 2004 Treaty Establishing a Constitution  for Europe did state this explicitly,  the Lisbon Treaty does that by referring in Declaration 17 concerning Primacy to the case-law of the European Court of Justice, which over the years has asserted the principles of (a) the superiority of EU law, (b) its direct effect in the territory of its Member States even if it has not been formally put through their National Parliaments, and (c) the constitutional character of the legal order from which European law emanates.

If the Lisbon Treaty were to be ratified European law and national law would deal with different areas and matters, as is normal in Federal States like the USA, Germany, Switzerland, Canada and Australia.  Lisbon would give the EU the power to make supranational laws that are binding on Member States and their citizens in many new areas and would take that power away from national Parliaments and from the citizens who elect these bodies.  The new Union would make the majority of laws for its Member States each year. Under Lisbon it would get further power to make laws by qualified majority voting in over 30 new policy areas. It would also be given new powers to take decisions in relation to as many specific issues. Altogether there would be some 68 areas or issues where individual Member States decide matters now and where under Lisbon they would lose their veto or their  right to decide.

3. The enormity of the constitutional change proposed by Lisbon is not generally  appreciated because the same name – “The European Union” – would be used before and after the Treaty would come into force, and because the notion of EU “citizenship” has already been introduced by the 1992 Maastricht  Treaty, although the Lisbon Treaty would change fundamentally the constitutional nature of  the Union itself, its Member States and the character and implications of  EU citizenship.

The change in the constitutional and political nature of the Union, its Member States and their citizens would be made in four legal steps which are set out in the Treaty of Lisbon:-

(a)  Lisbon would establish a European Union with full legal personality and a fully independent corporate existence in all Union areas for the first time, so that the post-Lisbon Union would be able to function as a State vis-a-vis other States and in relation to its own citizens (Art. 47, amended TEU; cf. Art.281 TEC);

(b)  This new European Union would replace the existing European Community and take over all of its powers and institutions (Art.1, amended TEU).  It would take over as well the “intergovernmental” powers over crime, justice and home affairs, as well as foreign policy and security, which at present are outside the scope of European law, leaving only aspects  of  the Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy outside the scope of its supranational power (Title 1 TFEU; Title V, amended TEU);

(c) It would thereby give a unified constitutional structure to the new Union which Lisbon would constitute or establish. The European Community would disappear and all spheres of public policy would come within the scope of supranational EU law-making either actually or potentially, as in any constitutionally unified Federation (Art.4.1 and Art.5, amended TEU and Arts.1-6 TFEU).   One says “potentially” because further inter-State treaties would be required to transfer the minority of law-making powers still remaining with the Member States to the new Union in the future, or to shift powers back from the supranational level to the Member States, something that has never happened up to now.  Under Lisbon supranational legislative acts would not yet be adopted in the sphere of Common Foreign and Security Policy and a new treaty would be needed to change that.  However the European Commission, a key supranational body, would through the High Representative proposed in the Lisbon Treaty gain the right of initiative in the foreign policy field, so that even in the light of Art. 31.2, amended TEU a de facto “supranationality” would be attained there.

(d) Lisbon would make us all real citizens of the new Federal Union which the Treaty would establish (Arts.9, amended  TEU and 20 TFEU), with all the implications of that for downgrading our present personal status as citizens of  sovereign  Nation States and superseding it by citizenship of  the component member states of a supranational European Federation of which we would henceforth be made citizens also. We would thus have a real dual citizenship henceforth,  as in the classical Federations mentioned.

4.  The Treaty would make us all real citizens of this new European Union for the first time, instead of us continuing as notional, symbolical or honorary European “citizens” as at present. In constitutional terms this would give the post-Lisbon Union a new source of democratic legitimacy. In turn population size would become the prime criterion for EU law-making, as in any unified State with a common citizenry.

One can only be a citizen of a State, and all States must have citizens.  Citizenship of the European Union at present is stated to “complement” national citizenship (Art.17 TEC), the latter being clearly primary, not least because the present EU is not a State or a corporate entity which can have individuals as members. Our “complementary” citizenship of the present EU is therefore essentially notional, symbolical or honorary.

By transforming the legal character of the European Union, the Lisbon Treaty would simultaneously transform the meaning of Union citizenship.  The Treaty would delete the word “complement” in the sentence,“Citizenship of the Union shall complement national citizenship”, so that the amended sentence would read: “Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to national citizenship” (Arts.9, amended TEU and 20 TFEU).  This would not replace our national citizenship, but would for the first time make us real citizens of a real European Union on top of our national citizenship.

This would be a real dual citizenship – not of two different States, but of two different levels of one State – as is normal in Federations which are established from the bottom up by constituent states surrendering their sovereignty to a superior entity, as occurred historically with the USA, 19th Century Germany, Switzerland, Canada and Australia.   This development would give the 500 million inhabitants of the present EU Member States a real separate citizenship from citizenship of their national States for the first time. It would give a treble citizenship to citizens of the individual Länder within Federal Germany.

The rights and duties attaching to this citizenship of the new Union would be superior to those attaching to citizenship of Ireland in any case of conflict between the two, because of the superiority of EU law over national law and Constitutions. The Preamble to the Treaty on European Union refers to the aim of “establishing a citizenship common to nationals of their countries”.

As most States recognise that one can only have a single citizenship internationally, it is probable that over time one’s European Union citizenship would tend to be regarded by other countries as one’s primary and internationally definitive citizenship rather than one’s Irish citizenship, especially if a network of EU embassies and an EU diplomatic service were to be established to deal with citizenship issues internationally, as the Lisbon Treaty envisages.

An important federal feature of the post-Lisbon EU is that its laws would be made primarily on the basis of aggregate population size, as in any unified State with a common citizenry, rather than on the basis of  the weighted votes of  the Member States as at present.  Currently European laws are made by a qualified or weighted majority of Member States so long as they can muster 255 votes out of 345, with each State having so many votes. Under Lisbon EU laws would be made by 15 States or more out of 27, so long as they constitute 65% of the aggregate EU population.  The number of EU citizens presumed to be for or against an EU law would thus become the primarily determining factor in adopting it or not, although the votes would be cast by Government Ministers on the EU Council of Ministers rather than by the citizens themselves or their directly elected representatives. Germany and France between them contain nearly one-third the EU’s population, so that this citizen-population criterion would significantly increase the relative weight of these and the other Big Member States in EU law-making, while it would significantly diminish that of smaller States.

Lisbon would insert a new Article 10 into the amended Treaty on European Union: “The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy. Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament. Member States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their governments …”  This  provision clearly sets up an alternative source of democratic legitimacy which challenges the right of national governments to be the representatives of their electorates in the EU.  Contrast this Lisbon Treaty formulation with what is stated to be the foundation of the present European Union (Art.6 TEU): “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.”

It seems fair to say that Lisbon marks a qualitatively new stage in the gradual evolution of institutional structure away from Europe’s Nation States, which slowly but surely emphasises the idea of democratic legitimacy being developed independently of the Member States by EU-level institutions.

The concept of a direct democratic citizens’ mandate for the new post-Lisbon European Union is reinforced by the encouragement which the same Article gives to the development of European-level political parties that would be part funded by the EU Commission. These are stated to “contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union.”(Art.10.4, amended TEU).  It is also emphasised by the obligation imposed on the EU Commission to bypass national governments and  “maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society”(Art.11.2, amended TEU).

5. Lisbon would create a Union Parliament for the Union’s new citizens

The Lisbon Treaty would make Members of the European Parliament, who at present are “representatives of the peoples of the States brought together in the Community“, into “representatives of the Union’s citizens” (Art.14.2, amended TEU; cf. current Art.189 TEC).   This clearly illustrates  the constitutional shift which the Treaty would make from the present European Union of national States and peoples to the new Federal Union of European citizens and their national states – the latter being henceforth reduced constitutionally and politically to effective provincial or regional status within the new Union.

The role of the European Parliament, which was first introduced as a modest check on the EU Executive and was styled an “Assembly” rather than a Parliament under  the Treaty of Rome,  has been elevated in successive EU Treaties. Its MEPs, direct representatives of EU citizens,  now have co-decision-making powers that put the EU Parliament on virtually equal terms with the Member Nation States in ever more areas – including electing the President of the Commission as presented to it by the European Council.  The shift of EU authority as arising directly from EU citizens rather than from the Member Nation States is reflected in the Lisbon Treaty when it states unequivocally that: “The Commission, as a body, shall be responsible to the European Parliament” (Art.17.8, amended TEU).  The European Parliament approves the Commission members en bloc and may force their collective resignation by a vote of censure.

By contrast, the Council of Ministers – consisting of representatives of the Member Nation States  – has shifted over time from being the directing authority of a European cooperation  in which the Member States acted largely by unanimous agreement, to being  a “second chamber” of national representatives casting votes on a qualified majority basis on European legislation proposed by the Commission. At the same time the Lisbon Treaty proposes to give the EU’s Prime Ministers and Presidents, collectively termed the “European Council”,   more political  control over the post-Lisbon Union

6. Lisbon would create a political Government of the new Union

The Lisbon Treaty would turn the European Council of Prime Ministers and Presidents into an “institution” of the new Union (Art.13, amended TEU), so that its acts or its “failing to act” would, like the other Union institutions, be subject to legal review by the EU Court of Justice (Arts.263-265, TFEU).

Legally speaking, these summit meetings of the European Council would thereafter no longer be “intergovernmental” gatherings of Prime Ministers and Presidents outside supranational European structures. As part of the new EU´s institutional framework, the Prime Ministers and Presidents would instead be constitutionally required to “promote the Union’s values, advance its objectives, serve its interests” and  “ensure the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions” (Art. 13.1, amended TEU).  They would also “define the general political direction and priorities thereof” (Art.15.1, amended TEU).

As an Institution of the new Union, the European Council of Prime Ministers and Presidents would, for example, be open in principle to exhortation or direction from the European Court of Justice to initiate steps to harmonise indirect taxes which constituted a “distortion of competition”, something that at present requires unanimity, if they were slow or reluctant to do this (Art.113 TFEU), or if they failed to take steps to ensure that the new Union’s “own resources” were adequate to meet its objectives(Art.311 TFEU).

The European Council would thus become in effect the Cabinet Government of the post-Lisbon Federal EU. Its individual members would in constitutional terms be obliged to represent the Union to their Member States as well as their Member States to the Union, with the former function having legal primacy in any case of conflict between the two.

7. The federalist character of the new Union political President

The federalist character of the European Council “summit” meetings in the proposed new Union structure is further underlined by the provision which would give the European Council a permanent political President for up to five years – two and a half years renewable once (Art.15.5, amended TEU).

There is no gathering of Heads of State or Government in any other international context which maintains the same chairman or president for several years, while individual national Prime Ministers and Presidents come and go.  The federalist character of the new Union President is emphasised also by the Treaty provision which forbids that person from holding any national office and which lays down that he or she shall “ensure the external representation of the Union“(Art.15.6, amended TEU).

It is part of the federalist evolution of the Union that the President of the European Council, the quarterly “summit” meetings of Member State Heads of State or Government, would no longer be a rotating Head of Government, but a permanent EU official.  If the President plays this role effectively – including setting the agenda for legislation and representing the EU on the international stage – he or she is bound to assume increasing status and importance. As a result it would be surprising if in due course there were not suggestions that the President should be directly elected by EU citizens, as France’s President Sarkozy has already urged.

8. The federalist character of the post-Lisbon Commission

As regards the EU’s executive arm, the Commission, the provision of the Lisbon Treaty which would reduce the number of Commissioners by one third of its Member States (Art. 17, amended TEU) is a symbolically important move away from “intergovernmentalism”, for that required  that every Member State had one of its own nationals at all times on the body which proposed all European laws.  An additional move towards a Federal institutional structure is the provision of the Lisbon Treaty which would remove from Member States the right to “propose” members of the Commission – which ensures that each State can insist on its proposals being accepted as a condition for it accepting the proposals of the others – and its replacement by a right to make “suggestions” only,  for the new Commission President to decide (Art.17.7, amended TEU; cf. current Article 214 TEC).  Individual Commissioners shall be chosen on the ground of their “European commitment” amongst other criteria (Art.17.3, amended TEU).  The Commission President would also have the power to shuffle the portfolios of individual Commissioners and require them to resign at will (Art.17.6, amended TEU)  These provisions would effectively give the Commission President powers equivalent to a national Prime Minister in the post-Lisbon EU.

9. Lisbon would endow the citizens of the new Union with a code of civil rights

All States have codes setting out the rights of their citizens. The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights would be that.  It would be made legally binding by the Lisbon Treaty and would “have the same legal value as the Treaties”(Art. 6.1, amended TEU) . This further embeds the concept that EU citizens have rights and responsibilities defined by the EU itself which transcend those attaching to their national citizenship. Indeed it embodies the concept that the EU determines and is the guarantor of those European citizenship rights across national boundaries.

The Charter is stated to be binding on the Union’s own institutions and on Member States in implementing Union law (Charter of Fundamental Rights, Art. 51). This limitation to EU law and to the EU institutions is unrealistic however because, (a) the principles of the primacy and uniformity of Union law mean that Member States would not only be bound by the Fundamental Rights Charter when implementing EU law, but also through the “interpretation and application of their national laws in conformity with Union laws” (v. ECJ judgements in the Factortame, Simmenthal and other law cases); and  (b) the Charter sets out the fundamental rights of EU citizens in areas where the Union has currently no competence, e.g. outlawing the death penalty, asserting citizens’ rights in criminal proceedings and various other areas. Post-Lisbon in any case Union law would require that the rights set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights are guaranteed for all EU citizens. They would be part of their EU citizens’ entitlements. There would be little point to the Charter otherwise.  In implementing EU law Member States would be required to implement people’s rights as EU citizens side by side with their rights as national citizens.

The EU has already got a human rights competence in that the Court of Justice can adjudicate on such rights as equality and non-discrimination under the existing Treaties. Therefore making the Charter legally binding does not extend the powers or competence of the Union as such. What Lisbon would do would be to give the ECJ a much wider range of human and civil rights to interpret and decide on, for the Charter would cover all the fundamental rights of EU citizens in the post-Lisbon Union.   Making the Charter legally binding would effectively extend considerably the human and civil rights jurisdiction of the EU Court of Justice and would make that Court the final body to decide most of the rights of 500 million EU citizens in the vast area now covered by European law, as against national Supreme Courts and the Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg which are our final fundamental rights Courts today.

If Lisbon is ratified it is only realistic to expect that the EU Commission will in time come to propose European laws to ensure the uniform implementation and guarantee of the EU citizens’ rights provisions of the Charter throughout the Member States. The citizens of the new Union would surely demand no less. American constitutional history provides ample evidence of the radical federalising potential of the fundamental rights jurisdiction of the US Supreme Court.

10. Lisbon would make National Parliaments formally subordinate to the new Union

The Treaty underlines the implicitly subordinate role of National Parliaments in the institutional structure of the new Union by stating that “National Parliaments contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union” by various means which are set out in Article12, amended TEU.

Under the pretext of enhancing the role of National Parliaments, the Lisbon Treaty actually institutionalises their subservience by defining such a limited role for them in the new Union’s structures. National Parliaments must be informed of and may scrutinise draft EU legislative acts, but while the Commission is required to review the legislation if a third or more of National  Parliaments object, the Commission can then decide to continue with the legislation unamended, with its decision confirmed by the normal QMV procedures.

Ultimately it is the EU itself, through the Court of Justice, which has the final right to arbitrate on claims of subsidiarity infringement (Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality, Article 7).  This provision of the Treaty permitting National Parliaments in effect to complain to the Commission, is small compensation for the loss of democracy involved by the loss of some 68 vetoes by National Parliaments as a result of other changes proposed by the Lisbon Treaty. National Parliaments have in any case already lost most of their law-making powers to the EC/EU. The citizens who elect them have lost their powers to decide these laws also.

11. Lisbon would give the new Union self-empowerment powers

These are shown by:

(a) the enlarged scope of the Flexibility Clause (Art.352 TFEU), whereby if  the Treaty does not provide the necessary powers to enable the new Union attain its very wide objectives, the Council may take appropriate measures by unanimity.  The Lisbon Treaty would extend this provision from the area of operation of the common market to all of the new Union’s policies directed at attaining its much wider post-Lisbon objectives. The Flexibility Clause has been widely used to extend EU law-making over the years;

(b) the proposed  Simplified Treaty Revision Procedure (Art.48, amended TEU), which would permit the Prime Ministers and Presidents on the European Council unanimously to shift Union decision-taking from unanimity to qualified majority voting in the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union;  and

(c)    the several “passerelles” or “ratchet-clauses“, which would allow the European Council to switch from unanimity to majority voting in certain specified areas, such as judicial cooperation in civil matters (Art.81.3 TFEU), in criminal matters (Art.83.1 TFEU), in relation to the EU Public Prosecutor (Art.86.4 TFEU) and the Multiannual financial framework (Art.312.2 TFEU).

Conclusion: A Federation without democracy

It is hard to think of any area of national law which would be unaffected by European law in the post-Lisbon EU. It is hard to think of any major function of a sovereign State which the new EU would not have if the Lisbon Treaty were to be ratified. The main one would seem to be the power to make its Member States go to war against their will.  The Treaty does however provide that the EU may go to war while individual Member States may “constructively abstain”(Arts.42-46, amended TEU).

The Treaty also contains a mutual defence clause (Art.42.7, amended TEU), which was so characterised by Commission President J.M.Barroso in a speech on the Treaty on 4 December 2007. This commitment to an EU “mutual defence” is to be distinguished from an obligation to participate in an EU “common defence”, viz. a common European army, which Art.42.2, amended TEU lays down that the “progressive framing of a common Union defence policy… will lead to” (emphasis added).

The obligation on the Union to “provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies” (Art. 311 TFEU), which means raising its “own resources” to finance them, may be regarded as conferring on it wide taxation and revenue-raising powers.  This Article empowers the new Union to “establish new categories of own resources” and in effect to endow itself by means of any tax, so long as the Council of  Ministers agrees that unanimously and it is approved by National Parliaments. Currently public expenditure and the taxation measures needed to finance it remain overwhelmingly at National State level. This is because such social services as health, education, social security and public housing, as well as policing and public transport – the government functions which cost most money – are still mainly at this level. That too is normal in such Federations as the USA, Germany etc.

Jean-Claude Piris, Director-General of the Legal Service of the Council of Ministers, refers to the EU as a “Partially Federal Union” in his well-known book, The Constitution for Europe: A Legal Analysis (Cambridge UP, 2006, p.192).  One might say that it is better characterised as a “Substantially Federal Union”. Piris contends that because it is only partially federal, it is not a federal State. One could say rather that the EU  is just like the classical Federations previously mentioned which have evolved over time and which gradually acquired the characteristics of statehood, and that the European Union post-Lisbon would have virtually all the features of a fully-developed State. As former Danish MEP Jens-Peter Bonde, author of the The Lisbon  Treaty-the Readable Version put it: “From the inside it looks like an arrangement based on Treaties between States. From the outside it looks like a State itself.” (see euinfo.ie and euabc.com)

The Lisbon Treaty would shift power away from voters in all EU countries and from small and middle-sized countries to the largest ones.  The post-Lisbon European Union would have its own government, with a legislative, executive and judicial arm, its own political President, its own citizens and citizenship, its own human and civil rights code, its own currency, economic policy and revenue, its own international treaty-making powers, foreign policy, foreign minister, diplomatic corps and United Nations voice, its own crime and justice code and Public Prosecutor.  It already possesses such normal State symbols as its own flag, anthem, motto and annual official holiday, Europe Day, 9 May, when it commemorates the 1950 Schumann Declaration proposing the European Coal and Steel Community as “the first step in the federation of Europe“, although these symbols are without a formal legal basis in the Treaties.

As regards the State authority of the new Union, this would be embodied in the Union’ s own executive, legislative and judicial institutions: the European Council, Council of Ministers, Commission, Parliament and Court of Justice.  It would be embodied also in the Member States and their authorities as they implement and apply EU law and interpret and apply national law in conformity with Union law. Member States would be constitutionally required to do this under the Lisbon Treaty. Thus EU “State authorities” as represented for example by EU soldiers and policemen patrolling our streets in EU uniforms, would not be needed as such.

Allowing for the special features of each case, all the classical Federal States which have been formed on the basis of power being surrendered by lower constituent states to a higher Federal authority have developed in a gradual way, just as has happened in the case of the European Union. The USA, 19th century Germany, Switzerland, Canada and Australia are the best-known examples. None of these came into the world as fully-fledged sovereign States. Indeed the EU has accumulated its powers much more rapidly than some of these Federations – in the short historical time-span of some fifty years.

However, the key difference between these classical Federations and the proposed new European Union is that the former, once their people had settled, share a common language, history, culture and national solidarity which gave them a democratic basis and made their State authority popularly legitimate and acceptable.

All stable and long-lasting States are founded on such communities, where people speak a common language and mutually identify with one another as one people – a  collective “We”. Because of this mutual identification and solidarity, minorities are willing freely to obey majority rule because they regard the majority as “their” majority. Likewise majorities are willing to respect minority rights because they attach to “their” minority.  That gives these  States a democratic basis.  In the European Union however there is no European people or “demos” of this kind.  The Treaty of Lisbon, like the EU Constitution before it,  is an attempt to construct a highly centralised European Federation artificially, from the top down, out of Europe’s many nations, peoples and States, without their free consent and knowledge  and in the interest of the Big States which would dominate its subsequent policy-making.

If there is to be a European Federation that is democratically acceptable and politically legitimate, the minimum constitutional requirement for it would be that its laws would be initiated and approved by the directly elected representatives of the people either in the European Parliament or the National Parliaments. Unfortunately, the Lisbon Treaty does not contain any such proposal.

Acknowledgements:   This document, which was originally presented as a submission to the National Forum on Europe, has been prepared by Anthony Coughlan, secretary, for the National Platform EU Research and Information Centre; Tel.:  01-8305792; Web-site: nationalplatform.org It has drawn on a number of different sources and the advice and assistance of a number of Irish and continental lawyers is acknowledged.  Particular thanks are due to Dr Klaus Heeger, legal adviser to the Independence and Democracy Group in the European Parliament, for insights into the constitutional character of a post-Lisbon European Union.

The document is an elaboration of Point 2 of our general document on the Lisbon Treaty: “What the Treaty of Lisbon Would Do”. People are free to use or adapt these documents as they see fit, without any need of reference to or acknowledgement of their source

Two Books:    The Lisbon Treaty – the Readable Version shows the deletions and additions which the Treaty would make in the two Consolidated EU Treaties – the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  This invaluable Consolidated Edition may be downloaded from  euinfo.ie or  euabc.com It has been edited by former Danish MEP Jens-Peter Bonde with the assistance of a team of legal advisers. It contains a detailed Index to the topics people may be interested in, showing how the Lisbon Treaty would affect them if it were to be ratified.   Jens-Peter Bonde, who was a member of the Convention on the Future of Europe which drew up the original EU Constitution of which Lisbon is a revamped version, has also written an illuminating short book analysing the Lisbon Treaty and giving the story of how it came into being: From EU Constitution to Lisbon Treaty. This is downloadable from the same web-sites:  euinfo.ie and  euabc.com

August 2008
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